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This article looks at flaws in the Law of China on Promotion of Small 
and Medium-Sized Enterprises 2002 (the Chinese Law on Promotion of 
SMEs 2002) and the Anti-Monopoly Law of China 2007 (the Chinese 
Anti-Monopoly Law 2007), as well as examining the inconsistencies 
between the State’s industrial policy and the current legal framework for 
Chinese privately owned SMEs. Although legal protection for SMEs is 
not a new research area in China, little scholarship has been devoted to 
conflicts between “law” and “policy” from a relationship standpoint 
between State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately owned SMEs. It 
argues that these SMEs are less able than SOEs to obtain chances for 
robust growth due to their privileges and immunities. By ignoring the 
market function, but emphasizing the economic role of the State, and by 
offering no genuine sanctions for senseless intervention from the State’s 
industrial policy, the Chinese Law on Promotion of SMEs 2002 and the 
Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 fail to establish fair competition 
circumstances for privately owned SMEs. Why cannot these two laws 
overcome the State’s industrial policy? Different approaches to 
achieving dissimilar goals in the Chinese market would be the answer. 
Thus, this article demonstrates that administrative powers granted by the 
State’s industrial policy are the biggest obstacle for privately owned 
SMEs, and then recommends methods to resolve this dilemma from the 
perspective of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007. 
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INTRODUCTION
This article explores the disadvantages of the current legal framework 
for privately owned small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)1 in 
 1. In 2003, the publication “Interim Provisions on the Standards for Medium 
and Small Enterprises” (2003) gave the first definition of standards for classification of 
SMEs in China: SMEs are companies with turnover between RMB 30 million Yuan and 
RMB 400 million Yuan, and between 400 and 3,000 employees. In 2011, the new 
regulation, “Provisions on the Classification Standards for Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises,” not only claimed that SMEs included micro, small and medium-sized 
enterprises, but also offered more categories of SMEs classified by industry. Zhongxiao 
Qiye Huaxing Biaozhun Guiding [Provisions on the Classification Standards for Small 
and Medium-Sized Enterprises] (2011) (promulgated by the MIIT, the NBS, the NDRC 
and the Ministry of Finance, June 18, 2011, effective June 18, 2011), 
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2011-07/04/content_1898747.htm. 
Table 1: Samples of Categories of Chinese SMEs in Different Industries 
Industry Category Enterprise Category Headcount Turnover (RMB Yuan) 
Manufacture 
Medium-Sized < 1000 < 40 million 
Small < 300 < 20 million 
Micro < 20 < 3 million 
Retail 
Medium-Sized < 300 < 200 million 
Small < 50 < 5 million 
Micro < 10 < 1 million 
Information Transmission 
Medium-Sized < 2000 < 1000 million 
Small < 100 < 10 million 
Micro < 10 < 1 million 
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China,2 as well as providing recommendations to reduce inconsistencies 
between Chinese laws and policies.3 The article abandons the 
conventional research perspective that the Anti-Monopoly Law of China 
2007 (the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007) provides monopoly 
exemptions4 to protect SMEs and expand their development spaces. 
Id. (table devised by the author). See, e.g., [Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Promotion of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 29, 2002, effective Jan. 1, 2003), 
http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-10/08/content_75040.html; see also [Interim Provisions 
on the Standards for Medium and Small Enterprises 2003] (promulgated by the State 
Econ. and Trade Comm’n, the Nat’l Dev. and Reform Comm’n, the Ministry of Fin. and 
the Nat’l Bureau of Statistics, Feb. 19, 2003, effective Feb. 19, 2003) (China); see also 
Zhongxiao Qiye Huaxing Biaozhun [Guiding Provisions on the Classification Standards 
for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises] (promulgated by the MIIT, the NBS, the 
NDRC and the Ministry of Finance, June 18, 2011, effective June 18, 2011), 
http://qq.gov.cn/zwgk/2011-07/04/content_189847.htm (China). 
 2. Because of the unique economic and legal characteristics, the term “China” in 
this research refers solely to mainland China. 
3. See LAW AND ECONOMICS WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: INSTITUTIONS FOR 
PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 149 (David Kennedy & 
Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2013) (pointing out that sound economic policy must be restricted 
and underpinned by law). 
 4. [The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated 
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008) 
2007 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 68, art. 13–15. 
Article 13 Any of the following agreements among undertakings 
competing with each other are prohibited: 
(i) fixing, or changing the price of products; 
(ii) limiting the output or sales of products; 
(iii) allocating the sales markets or the raw material 
purchasing markets; 
(iv) limiting the purchase of new technology or new facilities, 
or the development of new products or new technology; 
(v) jointly boycotting transactions; 
(vi) other monopolistic agreements identified by the 
antimonopoly authorities. For the purposes of this Law, 
monopoly agreements include agreements, decisions and other 
“concerted conducts designed to eliminate or restrict 
competition. 
Article 14 Any of the following agreements between an 
undertaking and a counter party are prohibited: 
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Rather, it devotes to an area where research is lacking and examines the 
SME legal protection from the perspectives of administrative 
interventions and privately owned SME’s relationships with State-owned 
enterprises (SOEs).5
Essentially, parts one and two of the article focuses on the legal flaws 
in the Law of China on Promotion of Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises 2002 (the Chinese Law on Promotion of SMEs 2002)6 and 
the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007.7 These two laws are expected to 
promote privately owned SMEs, but they fail to do so because they 
emphasize the economic role of the State and offer no genuine sanctions 
for senseless administrative intervention. This article therefore analyzes 
the relationship between the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 and
industrial policy in the process of privately owned SMEs’ growth, in part 
three. Having argued that the Chinese industrial policies grant too many 
privileges and immunities to SOEs and administrative agencies, and 
interrupt the normal growth of privately owned SMEs, part four of this 
article demonstrates that these unilateral interventions should be limited 
and changed by relevant laws in the future. 
(i) fixing the price for resale; 
(ii) restricting the lowest price for resale; 
(iii) other monopolistic agreement identified by the 
antimonopoly authorities. 
Article 15 Agreements among undertakings with one of the 
following objectives shall be exempted from the application of 
article 13, 14 if [it can be proved to be in any of the following 
circumstances] . . . 
(iii) agreements made by small and medium-sized 
enterprises to improve operational efficiency and to 
enhance their competitiveness.  
 5. The basis for comparison of SOEs and privately owned SMEs in China is that 
the State-owned economy exited from SMEs by the end of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan 
period (2006–2010). Shao Ning, Shiyiwu Yangqi Gaige he Shierwu Silu [Central SOE 
Reform during 11th Five-Year Plan and the Process for 12th Five-Year Plan], PRESS 
CONFERENCE OF THE STATE COUNCIL INFORMATION OFFICE (Feb. 22, 2011), 
http://www.scio.gov.cn/xwfbh/xwbfbh/wqfbh/2011/0222/. 
 6. See generally [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Promotion of Small 
and Medium-Sized Enterprises]. 
 7. See generally [The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China]. 
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I. A BLIP FOR CHINESE PRIVATELY OWNED SMES: THE CHINESE LAW ON 
PROMOTION OF SMES 2002
Going back to the early period of China’s SMEs, from the beginning 
of 20028 to the end of 20079, the SMEs grew at their fastest pace,10 and 
reached a new high in both quantity and quality.11 A series of policies on 
the promotion of SMEs,12 and the Chinese Law on Promotion of SMEs 
 8. The year 2002 became a milestone of the Chinese establishment of the 
SMEs’ legal framework because the first SME promotion law, the Chinese Law on 
Promotion of SMEs 2002, was adopted. See [Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Promotion of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises]. 
 9. The reasons why the fastest pace ended in 2007 can be summarized as 
follows: (1) after the late-2000s global financial crisis, the tendency of Guojin Mintui,
“the State advances while the private sector retreats,” fully emerged in China. Michael 
Wines, China Fortifies State Businesses to Fuel Growth, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/30/world/asia/30china.html. In order to exploit SOEs 
advantages to improve the economy in such a background, China invested billions of 
dollars to promote SOEs. Id. (2) The Chinese Law on Promotion of SMEs 2002 has flaws 
in limiting administrative actions (see sub-section B. The Legal Flaws in the Chinese Law 
on Promotion of SMEs 2002 in Section I below). (3) The Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 
2007 fails to remedy the legal flaws in the Chinese Law on Promotion of SMEs 2002 (see
sub-section B. Challenges for Chinese Privately Owned SMEs – Disobedient SOEs and 
Administrative Agencies in Section II below). 
 10. ZHONGGUO ZHONGXIAO QIYE FAZHAN BAOGAO (2008-2009) [CHINA’S SME
DEVELOPMENT REPORT (2008–2009)] 7, 39–40 (Li Zibin et al. eds., 2009).
 11. As regards quantity, SMEs have accounted for 99% of all Chinese enterprises 
from 2003 onward. As regards quality, SMEs provided approximately 60% of Chinese 
GDP in 2007, which had increased by nearly 10% since 2001. Research Group of China 
SME Index of Economic Development, Preface to ZHONGGUO ZHONGXIAO QIYE JINGJI 
FAZHAN ZHISHU YANJIU BAOGAO (2005) [RESEARCH REPORT ON CHINA SME INDEX OF 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2005)] (2008). 
 12. Chinese SME promotion policies include [Several Opinions of the State 
Council on Cultivating the Social Service System of SMEs] (2000) and [Several 
Statements of the State Council on Encouraging and Promoting the Development of 
SMEs] (effective Aug. 24, 2000). See, e.g., Mingxia Chi, [9 Issues in Implementing the 
11th Five-Year Plan for SME Growth Project], CHINA BUSINESS TIMES (Dec. 30, 2005), 
www.xinhuanet.com. The publication “the 12th Five-Year Plan for SME Growth” (2011–
2015) aimed to improve the development environment and enhance the viability, 
competitiveness and sustainability of SMEs. The policy document [Several Statements of 
the State Council on Further Promoting the Development of SMEs] (2009) repeated that 
SMEs are a major force in China’s economic and social development. See Several 
Opinions of the State Council on Further Promoting the Development of Small-and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises, LAW INFO CHINA (2009), 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=8147&CGid=. 
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2002, made a significant contribution to SME growth. However, this 
momentum did not last long, because the Chinese Law on Promotion of 
SMEs 2002 had some unavoidable legal flaws,13 which will be analyzed 
below.
A. A Dreamlike Period for Chinese SMEs between 2000 and 2007 
In the Spring of 2000, a State’s first individual policy on SME 
promotion, ‘Several Statements of the State Council on Cultivating the 
Social Service System of SMEs’ (2000),14 was released and started a 
period of SMEs’ prosperity.15 This policy was designed in the interest of 
Chinese SMEs, and it enhanced their sustainability and established multi-
 13. See [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Promotion of Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises] art. 6, 7, 13. 
Article 6 . . . No unit may, in violation of laws and regulations, 
charge fees to or impose fines on small and medium-sized 
enterprises, nor collect money or things of value from them. The 
enterprises shall have the right to refuse to make the payment and 
the right to report and make accusations related to violations of 
the provisions mentioned above. 
Article 7 Administrative departments shall safeguard the lawful 
rights and interests of small and medium-sized enterprises, 
protect their right to participate in fair competition and 
transaction according to law, and they may not discriminate 
against the enterprises or add unequal conditions to their 
transactions. . . .  
Article 33 The State gives guidance to, promotes and regulates 
the restructuring of the assets of small and medium-sized 
enterprises through merges, purchases, etc., in order to optimize 
the allocation of resources.  
 14. Chinese SME promotion policies include [Several Statements of the State 
Council on Cultivating the Social Service System of SMEs]. 
 15. Interview with a Chinese scholar on SME policy, in Beijing, China (Oct. 22, 
2012) (the scholar did not allow the researcher to use his name in any written work 
arising from the study, but did consent to being interviewed). 
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level, multi-channel, and multi-function social networks for these 
SMEs.16
 
Figure 2: An Expected Social Service System of SMEs in China17 
 
However, establishing a successful ‘Social Service System of SMEs’ 
was a long road from concept to practice. And this policy emphasized the 
role of Central Government and local governments at, or above, the 
county level in the SMEs’ promotions process.18
 16. From then on, several supporting systems for SMEs, such as finance support, 
technical support, marketing support, administrative support, etc., have been steadily 
improved in China. See, e.g., id.; see also Xiao Jianzhong & David Smallbone, Regional
Variations in the Environment for Entrepreneurship Development: A Tale of Three Cities 
in China, 56TH WORLD CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SMALL 
BUSINESSES [ICSB] sec. 2.2 (2011). 
 17. YAO OUYANG ET AL., ZHONGGUO ZHICHI ZHONGXIAO QIYE FAZHAN DE 
ZHENGCE HE FUWU TIXI YANJIU [RESEARCH ON IMPROVING POLICIES AND SERVICE SYSTEM 
FOR SUPPORTING SME’S DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA] 195 (2009) (figure translated from 
Chinese by the author). 
 18. Andrew Atherton & David Smallbone, State Promotion of SME Development 
at the Local Level in China: An Examination of Two Cases, 2 J. OF CHINESE 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 225–26 (2010). 
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Table 3: The Administrative Divisions of Mainland China (at and 
above the County Level)19 
Country Level Provincial Level Prefectural Level County Level 
The Central 
Government of China 
Provinces
Sub-Provincial Level 
Cities 
Prefectural Level 
Cities 
Autonomous
Prefectures 
Districts 
Counties 
County Level 
Cities 
Autonomous
Counties 
Special Districts 
Banners
Autonomous
Banners
Autonomous
Regions
Prefectural Level 
Cities 
Autonomous
Prefectures 
Municipalities 
Prefectural Level 
Cities 
Districts/Counties 
In the Summer of 2000, another State’s policy, ‘Several Statements of 
the State Council on Encouraging and Promoting the Development of 
SMEs’ (2000),20 which developed SOEs and at the same time supported 
privately owned SMEs,21 came into effect. However, too much economic 
power and too many rights were granted to the Chinese governments,22
 19. See The Local Administrative System, CHINA’S POLITICAL SYSTEM,
http://www.china.org.cn/english/Political/28842.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2017) (table 
devised by author). 
 20. [Several Statements of the State Council on Encouraging and Promoting the 
Development of SMEs]. 
 21. The publication “Several Statements of the State Council on Encouraging and 
Promoting the Development of SMEs” ought to be a good way to develop SOEs and 
privately owned SMEs in a balanced way toward establishing collaboration and 
complementary industry groups. Id. In 2002, SMEs captured over 95% of the total 
amount of enterprises in China, an increase of 0.2% compared with 2001. Concurrently, 
the total profit of SMEs rose more than 33% from the previous year. See, e.g., id.
 22. See, e.g., IP/97/348, European Commission Press Release, Improving and 
Simplifying the Business Environment for Business Start-ups (Apr. 24, 1997) (pointing 
out that “many regulations have been brought into force over the last 20 years and, 
together with administrative procedures, they have had a cumulative effect on enterprises 
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so that any local government at, or above, the county level could guide 
the development approach of local SMEs within their administrative 
regions.23 This led to a situation whereby SME growth could rely mainly 
on administrative interventions. However, despite the policy having a 
negative influence on the Chinese market, the development of SMEs for 
the period between 2002 and 2007 was extremely significant. These two 
SME policies were the forerunners in the process toward the Chinese 
SMEs’ legal framework establishment.  
In 2003, the first law on the promotion of SMEs, the Chinese Law on 
Promotion of SMEs 2002, came into effect in order to improve the 
business environment for SMEs and to determine active and lawful 
support for SME growth.24 Since then, support for developing SMEs has 
occupied a higher priority at the legal level in China. Accordingly, SMEs 
which has stifled their daily operations and affected their competitiveness…the burden is 
disproportionately heavy on smaller enterprises…”). 
 23. Xiao Jianzhong & Smallbone, supra note 16. 
 24. [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Promotion of Small and Medium-
Sized Enterprises] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 29, 
2002, effective Jan. 1, 2003), http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-
12/06/content_1382128.htm.   
Article 1 This Law is enacted for the purpose of improving the 
business environment for small and medium-sized enterprises, 
promoting their sound development, creating more job 
opportunities in both urban and rural areas, and giving play to the 
important role of such enterprises in national economic and social 
development.
Article 2 For purposes of this Law, small and medium-sized 
enterprises refer to the different forms of enterprises under 
different ownerships that are established within the territory of 
the People’s Republic of China according to law, that help to 
meet the social needs and create more job opportunities, that 
comply with the industrial policies of the State and that are small 
and medium-sized in production and business operation . . . . 
Article 3 With regard to small and medium-sized enterprises, the 
State applies the principles of active support, strong guidance, 
perfect service, lawful standardization and guaranteed rights and 
interests, in order to create a favorable environment for their 
establishment and development.”  
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experienced increasing profits in 2004.25 However, the Chinese Law on 
Promotion of SMEs 2002 also encouraged the local governments and 
agencies to improve services for SMEs.26
At the beginning of 2005, China released one additional industrial 
policy, which was related to SMEs’ development, namely ‘Several 
Statements of the State Council on Encouraging, Supporting and Guiding 
the Development of Individual and Private Economy and Other Non-
Public Sectors of the Economy’ (2005).27 This was a landmark decision, 
determining that privately owned SMEs were a vital component of the 
Chinese market economy and an important propeller of the State’s 
 25. Joint Research Group on SME’s Development, 2005 Zhongguo Feigong 
Jingji Chengzhangxing Zhongxiao Qiye Fazhan Baogao [The Report of China’s SME’s 
Development and Growth (2005)], SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGE, CHINA (Dec. 1, 2005), 
http://www.szse.cn/main/aboutus/bsyw/zxqyszlt/200512017960.shtml (pointing out that 
the value of Chinese SMEs in 2004 was nearly 2.5 times that of 2001, a 34.4% average 
annual growth). 
26. See [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Promotion of Small and 
Medium-sized Enterprises] art. 38–42.  
Article 38 The State encourages all sectors of the society to 
establish and improve the service system for small and medium-
sized enterprises and to provide them with services. 
Article 39 The government shall, in light of actual needs, support 
the institutions established in the service of small and medium-
sized enterprises and see that they provide top-notch services to 
the enterprises.  
Article 40 The State encourages the various kinds of public 
intermediary agencies to provide the small and medium-sized 
enterprises with … services . . . .  
Article 41 The State encourages related institutions and 
institutions of higher education to train managerial, technical and 
other personnel for small and medium-sized enterprises . . .  . 
Article 42 The self-regulating trade organizations shall actively 
serve the small and medium-sized enterprises. 
 27. Chinese SME promotion policies include [Several Opinions of the State 
Council on Cultivating the Social Service System of SMEs]. 
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productive forces.28 Subsequently, the positive trend for SMEs continued 
over the following two years.29 In 2006, the Central Government of 
China put forward the first ‘SME Growth Project’,30 a clearer and more 
systematic SME policy than the previous policies, which would push 
SMEs to develop in the long-term.31 In addition, one further measure 
extremely beneficial to SMEs was adopted, namely the Law of China on 
Enterprise Income Tax 2007 which proposed to reduce taxes for SMEs.32
Due to so many Chinese industrial policies and laws on the promotion 
of SMEs, SMEs increased at the fastest pace since the very beginning of 
the 21st Century.33 However, the development of SMEs was not always 
smooth or straightforward because the Chinese Law on Promotion of 
SMEs 2002 failed to establish the idea of fair competition and the 
limitation for inappropriate intervention. When inappropriate 
administrative directives considered the State’s short-term economic 
interest that was partially presented by SMEs, especially in the first 
global financial crisis of the 21st Century, China’s privately owned 
SMEs were unable to avoid the fate of being marginalized by the State. 
Therefore, for the sake of improving the legal support for privately 
owned SMEs, it is essential to appreciate the legal flaws in the Chinese 
Law on Promotion of SMEs 2002.
 28. See id.
 29. Liu Xiangfeng, SME Development in China: A Policy Perspective on SME 
Industrial Clustering, in SME IN ASIA AND GLOBALIZATION 37–68 (2007). 
 30. [9 Issues in Implementing the 11th Five-Year Plan for SME Growth Project]. 
 31. See e.g., Zhongguo Guomin Jingji he Shehui Fazhan Shiyiwu Guihua 
Gangyao [The Outline of the Eleventh Plan for National Economy and Social] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 2006, effective 
Mar. 14, 2006),  
http://www.gov.cn/ztzl/2006-03/16/content_228841_15.htm. 
 32. See generally [Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(revised)] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, 
effective Jan. 1, 2008), http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_39_3339_0_7.html. “Article 
28 As regards a small meagre-profit enterprise satisfying the prescribed conditions, the 
enterprise income tax shall be levied at a reduced tax rate of 20%.” Id. art. 28. 
 33. In 2007, the number of Chinese industrial SMEs experienced an increase of 
nearly 24% compared to 2005. See CHINA’S SME DEVELOPMENT REPORT (2008-2009), 
supra note 10, at 39–40. During the same period, the gross value of industrial output of 
Chinese SMEs represented an increase of over 46% compared to 2005. Id.
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B. The Legal Flaws in the Chinese Law on Promotion of SMEs 
2002
1. Emphasizing the State and Ignoring the Market  
Under the semi-government-oriented economic growth model, the 
idea of the market mechanism is not deeply rooted in the Chinese 
traditions and culture.34 Hence, for China, in the progress toward drafting 
the Chinese Law on Promotion of SMEs 2002, overlooking certain 
functions of the market’s mechanisms was inevitable. In effect, the 
phenomenon of emphasizing the State’s function, while ignoring the 
market mechanisms, permeates the Chinese Law on Promotion of SMEs 
2002.
First of all, the Chinese Law on Promotion of SMEs 2002 lacks the 
idea of fair competition. Following this Law, the State committed to 
promoting the business cooperation of large-scale SOEs and privately 
owned SMEs.35 Using Japanese experience for guidance, this has been a 
successful approach,36 with restrictions toward the risks of vertical 
 34. After practicing a “Planned Economy Model” for more than thirty years from 
1952, China spent a long time transforming its “Planned Economy Model” into the 
“Market Economy Model.” See, e.g., CHINA LEARNS FROM THE SOVIET UNION, 1949-
PRESENT 164 (Thomas P. Bernstein & Hua-yu Li eds., 2010); see also China Continues to 
Promote Opening-Up and Innovation, THE STATE COUNCIL OF CHINA,
http://english.gov.cn/premier/news/2016/03/22/content_281475312341145.htm (last 
updated March 22, 2016). In 1993, the Central Government held that the State should pay 
more attention to the market mechanisms and the competitive order. CHINA’S DEEP 
REFORM: DOMESTIC POLITICS IN TRANSITION 239 (Lowell Dittmer & Guoli Liu eds., 
2006).
 35. [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Promotion of Small and Medium-
Sized Enterprises] art. 32. 
Article 32 The State encourages and supports large enterprises to 
establish, on the basis of resources allocation by the market, 
stable relations of cooperation with small and medium-sized 
enterprise in respect of the supply of raw and semi-processed 
materials, production, marketing, and technological development 
and updating, in order to help promote the development of small 
and medium-sized enterprises. 
 36. Japan used the “Supplier System” to develop SMEs in the manufacturing 
industries: SMEs worked as subcontractors to large-scale enterprises and in most cases 
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integration.37 However, this was not the case because unrestrained 
cooperation under the Chinese Law on Promotion of SMEs 2002 existed 
before 2008 (when the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 came into 
effect); in fact, during the period between 2003 and July 2008, hardly 
any Chinese law or policy sought to limit this cooperation approach.38
Consequently, in the process of cooperation China’s SOEs, and their 
corresponding privately owned SMEs in the same industry, could form a 
vertical monopoly group and thereby create barriers to entry and 
obstacles to fair competition.39 After 2008, although the Chinese Anti-
Monopoly Law 2007 was implemented, nothing was changed in the 
Chinese Law on Promotion of SMEs 2002.40 Administrative mergers in 
the steel industry confirmed this.41
both of them achieved a win-win situation. See, e.g., Hiroshi Ueno et al., Supplier System 
and Innovation Policy in Japan, in SMALL FIRMS AND INNOVATION POLICY IN JAPAN
(Cornelia Storz ed., 2006). 
 37. See YUAN HONGLIN, WANSHAN ZHONGXIAO QIYE ZHENGCE ZHICHI TIXI
YANJIU [STUDY ON IMPROVEMENT OF POLICY SUPPORT SYSTEM IN SMES] 148 (2010).
 38. “[I]n 2003, the Ministry of Commerce (‘MOFCOM’) and the National 
Development and Reform Commission (‘NDRC’) enacted, respectively, the Provisional 
Regulation on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors 
and the Provisional Regulation on the Prohibition of Price Monopolistic Conduct which 
contain rules on merger review and prohibition of price monopolies.” Shang Ming, 
Antitrust in China – A Constantly Evolving Subject, 5 COMPETITION L. INT’L 4, 5 (2009). 
However, none of them focused on the business cooperation of large-scale SOEs and 
privately owned SMEs. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Before the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 was enacted in 2007, there was 
another effective law to maintain fair competition, the Law of China against Unfair 
Competition 1993. See [Law of the People’s Republic of China Against Unfair 
Competition]. This was a significant point in the development of Chinese competition 
policy and law. However, this Law, which pays more attention to the principles of 
voluntariness, equality, impartiality, honesty, and even the public commercial morality, 
merely concerned the cooperation between large-scale SOEs and privately owned SMEs. 
See id. Therefore, the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 has been considered as the first 
law ought to concern this cooperation.  
 41. In the 21st Century, since the first Chinese policy concerning the 
restructuring of domestic steel enterprises was released in 2005, the desires and demands 
of the State have always affected its approach without it thinking about the need for fair 
competition and the survival situation of steel SMEs. Subsequently, without regarding the 
Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007, the [Steel Industry Revitalization Plan of China] 
(2009) was released. It aimed (1) to form more than three large-scale undertakings (with 
a production capacity of more than 50 million tonnes) and about seven medium-scale 
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Second, the Chinese Law on Promotion of SMEs 2002 does not 
change the existing approach toward the growth of SMEs: SME growth 
still relies mainly on decision-making by way of administrative 
directives, especially support from the State’s industrial policy. Because 
the Chinese Law on Promotion of SMEs 2002 (Article 33) emphasizes 
the powers and functions of the State,42 promoting SMEs’ growth in this 
Law means taking initiatives to give priority to industrial policy. A 
negative conclusion is not difficult to draw, based on a side-by-side 
comparison. 
On the positive side, in order to solve a chronic problem of SMEs, 
namely their short lifespan, the Chinese Law on Promotion of SMEs 
2002 emphasized the powers and functions of the State.43 As market 
participants, realizing short-term profit maximization is the ultimate goal 
for most privately owned SMEs.44 However, in a brutally competitive 
market, making profits is a tricky issue for those SMEs. In order to make 
a quick profit in a short time, a large number of them abandon “the 
principle of good faith”,45 such as honesty and other public commercial 
morality,46 while instead devoting their time to selling counterfeit 
undertakings (with a production capacity of 10 to 30 million tonnes) in the steel industry 
by 2011; and (2) to raise the output of the top ten large steel undertakings to over 60% of 
total Chinese steel output by 2015, from 44% in 2009. Several Chinese mainstream 
media reported that the mergers of steel companies under this plan were Administrative 
Mergers. See, e.g., Gangtie Chanye Tiaozheng he Zhenxing Guihua [Steel Industry 
Revitalization Plan of China] (promulgated by the SETC, Mar. 20, 2009, effective Mar. 
20, 2009), http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2009-03/20/content_1264318.htm; He Rongliang,
Gangtie Dachongzu de Sige Yinyou [Four Malaises of the Chinese Steel Mergers], THE
ECON. OBSERVER (Sept. 8, 2009), http://www.eeo.com.cn/observer/shelun/ 
2009/09/08/150519.shtml. 
 42. [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Promotion of Small and Medium-
Sized Enterprises]. 
 43. ZENG WEI, ZHONG XIAO QI YE SHENG CUN ZHUANG KUANG DIAO CHA BAO 
GAO [AN INVESTIGATION ON THE STATUS OF MEDIUM AND SMALL ENTERPRISES] 18 (2009). 
 44. Id. at 35. 
 45. [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Promotion of Small and Medium-
Sized Enterprises] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 29, 
2002, effective Jan. 1, 2003), http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-
12/06/content_1382128.htm. “Article 9 small and medium-sized enterprises shall observe 
professional ethics, abide by the principle of good faith, work hard to raise their business 
level and increase the ability to develop themselves.” Id.
 46. [AN INVESTIGATION ON THE STATUS OF MEDIUM AND SMALL ENTERPRISES],
supra note 43, at 35. “[Because of minimal marketing, poor quality products could be 
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products. Predictably, giving up integrity is shortsighted behavior in 
terms of SMEs’ development. Extravagant profits may only lead them to 
shutdowns. Accordingly, there is an average lifespan of approximately 
three years in China’s privately owned enterprises.47 Facing such a grim 
reality, the Chinese Law on Promotion of SMEs 2002 realized that 
although establishing the integrity of privately owned SMEs was an 
extremely challenging task, it was time to commence the journey toward 
that goal. 
On the negative side, after 2003, when the Chinese Law on Promotion 
of SMEs 2002 came into effect, the government-oriented approach,
rather than the legal-oriented approach, remained and determined the 
fates of privately owned SMEs.48 Hence, a competitive market 
environment is not what has emerged. For example, in 1999 in the 
Chinese gas station sector, the State decided to enhance the market share 
of petrol SOEs in the refined oil retail market and reduce the number of 
privately owned gas stations, through administrative directive powers.49
Moreover, after the Chinese Law on Promotion of SMEs 2002 came into 
force, a further decline in gas stations ownership occurred.50
profitable; SME bosses are able to accumulate wealth under such circumstances. A lot of 
SME bosses only make the focus on profits, and treat SMEs as money-making tools].” Id.
 47. HUANG MENGFU, ZHONG GUO SHANG HUI FA ZHAN BAO GAO NO.1 (2004)
[THE DEVELOPMENT REPORT OF NON-STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN CHINA NO.1 (2004)] 
411 (2005). 
 48. See, e.g., [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Promotion of Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises]. “Article 33 The State gives guidance to, promotes and 
regulates the restructuring of the assets of small and medium-sized enterprises through 
merges, purchases, etc., in order to optimize the allocation of resources.” Id. art. 33. 
 49. The order [Order No. 38 of 1999] granted exclusive rights to petrol SOEs to 
control the oil resources in China from 1999. See Guanyu Qingli Zhengdun 
Xiaolianyouchang he Guifan Yuanyou Chengpinyou Liutong Zhixu de Yijian (යனΎ⌮
ᩚ栧⮷䁤㱡〉␴奬劫⍇㱡ㆸ⑩㱡㳩忂䦑⸷䘬シ奩) [On the Liquidating and 
Restructuring of the Small Oil Refining Factories and Standardizing the Circulation 
Order of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (Order No.38 of 1999)] (promulgated by the 
SETC, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC), the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), the State Administration of Taxation 
(SAT) and the Quality and Technical Supervision Bureau, July 7, 1999, effective July 7, 
1999), http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/b/d/200304/20030400082182.html. 
 50. By the end of 1998, about 56,300 privately owned gas stations existed in the 
Chinese refined oil retail market, occupying more than 60 percent of the market share. 
However, by the end of 2006, privately owned gas stations only accounted for less than 
50 percent of the total number in China. See, e.g., Changjie Liu & Xiangdong Zhang, 
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Overall, therefore, the Chinese Law on Promotion of SMEs 2002 has
never improved the fate of privately owned SMEs on a long-term basis. 
The State’s industrial policy has continued to increase its influence. 
However, without developing sound market rules and limiting 
administrative interventions, Chinese privately owned SMEs do not exist 
in a fair market and find it difficult therefore to achieve a genuine 
competitive advantage. Thus, reliance merely on the Chinese Law on 
Promotion of SMEs 2002 cannot reproduce the high growth that SMEs 
achieved from 2000 to 2007.51
2. No Genuine Sanctions for Inappropriate Administrative 
Directives in China 
The Chinese Law on Promotion of SMEs 2002 lacked sanctions 
against those who issued inappropriate administrative directives, and also 
failed to offer legal remedies for privately owned SME victims. In 
particular, Article 4 of the Chinese Law on Promotion of SMEs 2002 
states that the State Council and the local governments (at or above the 
county level) could guide and serve SMEs located within their respective 
administrative territories.52 Because of regional differences in China, 
different local governments may pursue different intervention models to 
Zhongshiyou Zhongshihua Niansui Banshu Minying Jiayouzhan [Chinese Oil SOEs 
Crushed Half of Private Gas Stations], THE ECON. OBSERVER (Apr. 8, 2006), 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20060408/11192485151.shtml; see also Li 
Zhichuan, Zhongguo Minying Shiyou Qiye Fazhan Zhuangkuang he Qianjing Zhanwang 
[Development and Prospect of Chinese Private Owned Oil Enterprises], 2012 INT’L
PETROLEUM ECON. 4 (2012). 
 51. HONGLIN, supra note 37, at 149. 
 52. [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Promotion of Small and Medium-
Sized Enterprises] art. 4. 
Article 4 The related departments under the State Council shall, 
according to the policies and overall planning of the State for 
small and medium-sized enterprises and within the scope of their 
respective functions and responsibilities, provide guidance and 
services to such enterprises. Local people’s governments at or 
above the county level, the administrative departments under 
them in charge of work in respect of enterprises and other 
departments concerned shall, within the scope of their respective 
functions and responsibilities, provide guidance and services to 
small and medium-sized enterprises. 
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promote local SMEs, and then protect local interests. Such a situation 
often results in conflict within different administrative areas.53 Hence, the 
adoption of inappropriate administrative directives affecting privately 
owned SMEs results in the market mechanisms being ignored, leading to 
an unhealthy development environment for SMEs. 
However, for the protection of those adversely affected by 
inappropriate administrative directives, genuine sanctions are definitely 
absent in the Chinese Law on Promotion of SMEs 2002. Article 7 of the 
Chinese Law on Promotion of SMEs 2002 stresses that administrative 
agencies shall not discriminate against SMEs or add unequal conditions 
to transactions of SMEs;54 however, without including strong punitive 
measures in the law, this far-reaching Article remains an empty threat. 
Article 6 of this law holds that when faced with inappropriate 
administrative directives, SMEs shall have the right to refuse, report and 
accuse, in cases of violations by administrative authorities who issue 
inappropriate administrative directives to their higher administrative 
authorities.55 However, nothing would happen after that, because it is the 
norm for officials to shield one another, so for administrative authorities 
that issue inappropriate administrative directives, admitting or even 
correcting mistakes is typically difficult by their higher administrative 
authorities.56 Therefore, because both Articles 6 and 7 of the Chinese 
Law on Promotion of SMEs 2002 are dysfunctional Articles for the 
protection of SMEs, there are no genuine sanctions against the infringers 
and no legal remedies for SME “victims.”  
Regrettably, the SMEs’ nightmare does not end there. In order to 
“whitewash” the above-mentioned flaws in the Chinese Law on 
 53. See Song Shengxia, Hebei Province Under Antitrust Investigation, GLOBAL 
TIMES BUS., CHINA (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/881412.shtml 
(pointing out as a by-product of the Chinese planned economy, administrative monopoly 
exists in almost all aspects of the State’s economy. However, this should be forbidden). 
 54. [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Promotion of Small and Medium-
Sized Enterprises]. 
 55. Id.
 56. Similar articles exist in the Law of China against Unfair Competition 1993 as 
well. See, e.g., [The Law of China against Unfair Competition 1993] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 2, 1993, effective Dec. 1, 1993) art. 30, 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383803.htm. 
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Promotion of SMEs 2002, an official statement was issued in China:57
this Law was a basic law in the area of support for SMEs, which only 
established a framework and many provisions in it were exhortations 
without actual effects and called for further improvements.58
Even worse, the flaw of having no genuine sanctions in the Chinese 
Law on Promotion of SMEs 2002 was exacerbated by a further expansion 
in the war between the State’s industrial policy and this Law, because 
essentially, enacting the Chinese Law on Promotion of SMEs 2002 did
not mean that China would consistently “Think Small First.”59 Instead, 
the State’s industrial policy is an unbeatable foe, and the Chinese Law on 
Promotion of SMEs 2002 is always on the back foot. For instance, going 
through the full text of the Chinese ‘Policies for the Development of Iron 
and Steel Industry’ (2005), one sees that it focused on how to make 
large-scale enterprises bigger and stronger.60 Despite this policy being 
released three years after the Chinese Law on Promotion of SMEs 2002,
the Law did not have any positive effect on it.61 In comparison with the 
State’s short-term interest, SMEs’ future was completely ignored in the 
steel industry by this policy.62
In summary, although around the time of the enactment of the 
Chinese Law on Promotion of SMEs 2002, SMEs saw a period of rapid 
development (2002–2007) on account on new State-sponsored SME 
promotion policies, this Law still had flaws, and failed to adequately 
57 . Lei Dongjun, Jiedu Zhongxiao Qiye Cujinfa [The Interpretation of the Law of 
China on Promotion of SMEs], CHINA SCIENCE DAILY, 1, 1 (2002). 
 58. Id.
 59. ENTERPRISE AND INDUSTRY, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THINKING BIG FOR 
SMALL BUSINESSES: WHAT THE EU DOES FOR SMES 4 (2011), 
http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/874/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/p
df (“the ‘Think Small First’ principle . . . means listening to SMEs before introducing 
new laws, examining the effect legislation will have on small businesses, and helping 
companies in need of support.”)  
 60. Policies for the Development of Iron and Steel Industry, ASIANLII.ORG,
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/pfdoiasi501/ (last visited May 15, 2017).  
 61. The author makes this statement because the Policies for the Development of 
Iron and Steel Industry (2005) which did not mention steel SMEs even once, made “ . . . 
consolidation of the industry a priority.” See, e.g., id.; see also ALAN H. PRICE ET AL., THE
CHINA SYNDROME: HOW SUBSIDIES AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION CREATED THE 
WORLD’S LARGEST STEEL INDUSTRY (2006),
http://www.ssina.com/news/releases/pdf_releases/ chinese_steel_subsidies_paper.pdf.   
 62. Id. 
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protect and promote SMEs affected by either inappropriate 
administrative directives or SOE actions. Consequently, in order to foster 
market mechanisms and limit the impact of administrative directives, the 
State urgently needed to enact the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law in the 
hope that it could bring a “second spring” for privately owned SMEs. 
II. HELPFUL OR UNHELPFUL – THE CHINESE ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW 2007
FOR PRIVATELY OWNED SMES
Because more and more economic activities have been carried out in 
the Chinese market and have increasingly affected competition levels 
there since 1978, the Central Government of China felt that the market 
required an anti-monopoly law. The State Council began to draft a 
proposal for an Anti-Monopoly Law as early as 1994.63 However, the 
formulation of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law was surrounded by 
controversy and was a prolonged process. Before the Chinese Anti-
Monopoly Law 2007 was first promulgated in 2007, several laws and 
policies concerned with fair competition were published in China in the 
1990s and 2000s.64 However, these laws and policies did not provide 
 63. XIAOYE WANG, THE EVOLUTION OF CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW 260 
(SSAP trans., Edward Elgar Publ’g Ltd. 2014) (2010).  
 64. These included the [Law of the People’s Republic of China Against Unfair 
Competition], [Provisions of the State Council on Prohibiting Regional Blockade in 
Market Economic Activities] (promulgated by State Council, Apr. 21, 2001, effective 
Apr. 21, 2001), CLI.2.35595(EN) (Lawinfochina), [Decisions of the State Council on 
Rectifying and Standardizing the Order in the Market Economy] (promulgated by State 
Council, Apr. 27, 2001, effective Apr. 27, 2001), CLI.2.35594(EN) (Lawinfochina). See,
e.g., [Provisions of the State Council on Prohibiting Regional Blockade in Market 
Economic Activities]. “These Provisions are formulated with a view to establishing and 
perfecting the market system which is unified all over the country, provided with fair 
competition, and which is well-ordered, and to prohibiting the acts of regional blockade 
in the market economic activities, getting rid of regional blockade and maintaining the 
order of socialist market economy.” Id. at art. 1. See also [Decisions of the State Council 
on Rectifying and Standardizing the Order in the Market Economy]. “In order to further 
deepen the reform and expanding the opening to the outside world, create a good 
environment for the national economic development vigorously and healthily, the State 
Council hereby decides, in light of China’s present situation of the order in the market 
economy, to rectify and standardize the order in the market economy throughout the 
country.” Id.
510 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 25.3 
unified guidance on the issue of fair competition in China.65 Such a 
situation was not resolved until 2007, when a comprehensive legal set of 
market rules, the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007, was finally 
adopted.66
Nevertheless, and significantly, when the Chinese Anti-Monopoly 
Law 2007 came into force in 2008, it was obvious that the Law did not 
meet SME expectations. The thirteen-year incubation period (1994–
2007) did not help matters, either.67 On the contrary, the law had several 
significant drawbacks and there remained much room for improvement. 
Firstly, there was not sufficient understanding of the exemption of 
agreements among SMEs.68 Secondly, there was a lack of effective 
sanctions in the law against those who issued inappropriate 
administrative directives to impede the growth of privately owned SMEs: 
this Law has failed to stop SOEs and administrative agencies from 
abusing their exclusive rights.69 The result is that, partially affected by
the imperfect Anti-Monopoly Law 2007, China’s privately owned SMEs’ 
pace of development has slowed since 2008, after a period of rapid 
growth in the previous six years. 
 65. See MARK WILLIAMS, COMPETITION POLICY AND LAW IN CHINA, HONG KONG 
AND TAIWAN 95 (2005) (describing the situation of Chinese competition laws and policies 
as a “patchwork of miscellaneous laws and regulations that seek to prevent the most 
damaging anti-competitive activities found in the transitional Chinese economy . . .”) 
(internal citation omitted). 
 66. See, e.g., Mark Williams, China, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
COMPETITION LAW IN ASIA 88, 109 (Mark Williams ed., 2013) (“A common issue that 
concerned consumers, private Chinese producers and foreign entrants to the domestic 
Chinese market was to ensure that SOEs were not exempted or afforded special treatment 
under the law.”); see also H. STEPHEN HARRIS ET AL., ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW AND 
PRACTICE IN CHINA 1 (2011).
 67. Huang Xiaowei, Fanlongduanfa Chutai shi Fanlongduan de Qidian [The
Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law Promulgated: the Starting Point against Monopolistic 
Behavior], SOUTHERN WEEKEND, CHINA, Sept. 16, 2007, at C16. 
 68. [The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China]. 
 69. See, e.g., DEBORAH HEALEY, ACADEMIC SOCIETY FOR COMPETITION LAW, A
Comparative Look at the Competition Law Control of State-Owned Enterprises and 
Government in China, in MORE COMMON GROUND FOR INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION 
LAW? 147 (Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2011); see also HARRIS ET AL., supra note 66, at 178. 
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A. SMEs – Protection Features which the Chinese Anti-Monopoly 
Law 2007 Cannot Ignore 
In the past, whether anti-monopoly law should concern SMEs or not 
provoked considerable debates.70 Due to their scale, protecting SMEs 
was basically considered a meaningless feature of anti-monopoly law.71
However, with the blossoming of the “Structure-Conduct-Performance” 
(SCP) Paradigm72, SMEs became important elements in anti-monopoly 
 70. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 26 (2nd ed. 2001) (pointing 
out that “[t]he best overall antitrust policy from a small-business standpoint is no antitrust 
policy”); see also ACADEMIC SOCIETY FOR COMPETITION LAW, THE GOALS OF 
COMPETITION LAW 73 (Daniel Zimmer ed., 2012) (pointing out that “[t]here are not many 
other specific instances in secondary legislation or individual cases where SME 
protection is explicitly mentioned. Nevertheless, the policy objective is still present in EU 
competition law.”); see also HARRIS ET AL., supra note 66, at 82–83 (pointing out that the 
Chinese anti-monopoly law improves SMEs). 
 71. See POSNER, supra note 70, at 26. 
72. See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW 
OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE (3rd ed. 2005) (noting that the SCP Paradigm (see 
Table 4 below) emerged in the 1930s at Harvard University, developed in the 1950s, and 
blossomed in the 1960s). Based on this Paradigm, Professor Hovenkamp concluded that 
“[a]ntitrust without structural analysis has become impossible.” Id. at 46.  
Table 4: Brief Table of the SCP Paradigm 
Structure (Number and Size 
Distribution of Firms) ĺ 
Conduct (Behavior of 
Firms) ĺ 
Performance (Market 
Power) 
Number of firms Pricing Production efficiency 
Number of buyers R&D Allocative efficiency 
Number of products Advertising Product quality 
Entry barriers Choice of technology Profits 
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law.73 Thus, so far, the consensus is that anti-monopoly law should 
protect the positive growth of SMEs.74
In Article 15(3) of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007, the law 
provides exemptions to agreements among SMEs;75 specifically, any 
agreement or category of agreements among SMEs which satisfies the 
following two conditions shall be exempted from the scope application 
of Articles 13 and 14 of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007, namely 
where (1) any agreement or category of agreements among SMEs does 
not afford such SMEs the possibility of eliminating competition in 
respect of a substantial part of the products in question; and (2) any 
agreement or category of agreements among SMEs allows consumers a 
fair share of the resulting benefit.76 According to the literal interpretation 
of the above-mentioned Articles, the Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 seems to 
protect SMEs. However, is that an accurate assessment?  
In order to address this issue, the objectives and purposes of the 
Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 need to be examined. In general, 
competition policy and law have multiple objectives: besides economic 
objectives, the wishes of society, the State’s culture and history, 
institutions in the State, and perceptions of the State, are all targets that 
competition policy and law take into consideration.77 Nonetheless, from 
the beginning of the 21st Century, the objectives of competition policy 
and law have gradually concentrated on two special areas: consumer 
 73. See, e.g., Hammond E. Chaffetz, The Antitrust Laws and Small Business, 2 
SEC. ANTITRUST L. 77 (1953) (pointing out that “small businesses are increasingly 
concerned about the problems of compliance with the antitrust laws”); see also MICHAEL 
E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS §§ 3, 12 (1990) (maintaining that 
treating SMEs’ development and anti-monopoly law separately may lead to inefficiency, 
which is harmful to the market activity and the competitive mechanism). 
 74. See, e.g., Press Releases 2005: SMEs Missing out on Benefits of Competition: 
Campaign Launched to Highlight Importance of Competition Law, OFFICE OF FAIR
TRADING (May 24, 2005), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/ 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2005/92-05; see also Putting Small 
Businesses First: Europe is Good for SMEs, SMEs are Good for Europe, EUR. COMM’N
(2008),
http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/2278/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/
pdf; see also WANG XIAOYE, FANLONGDUANFA [COMPETITION LAW] 5–9 (2011). 
 75. [The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China]. 
 76. Id.
 77. CHRISTOPHER TOWNLEY, ARTICLE 81 EC AND PUBLIC POLICY 1 (2009). 
2017] A Maze of Contradictions 513 
welfare and efficient allocation of resources.78 However, no matter where 
this issue goes, among all of the objectives, the economic objective is, in 
practice, the most essential one.79 Without it other objectives may not be 
achieved.
Turning the focus to the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007, privately 
owned SMEs provoke debates on the economic objectives of this law. 
The first point of discussion is the relationship between consumer 
welfare and the “public interest”80 – the reconciliation of competing 
interests81 between the State’s interest and those of the enterprises and 
 78. See, e.g., Commission Communication Guidelines on the Application of 
Article 81(3) of the Treaty, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 13, 87 (now Article 101(3) TFEU). 
13. The objective of Article 81 is to protect competition on the 
market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of 
ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. Competition and 
market integration serve these ends since the creation and 
preservation of an open single market promotes an efficient 
allocation of resources throughout the Community for the benefit 
of consumers. 
…
87. The decisive factor is the overall impact on consumers of the 
products within the relevant market and not the impact on 
individual members of this group of consumers. In some cases a 
certain period of time may be required before the efficiencies 
materialise. Until such time the agreement may have only 
negative effects. The fact that pass-on to the consumer occurs 
with a certain time lag does not in itself exclude the application 
of Article 81(3). However, the greater the time lag, the greater 
must be the efficiencies to compensate also for the loss to 
consumers during the period preceding the pass-on. 
See also Case T-168/01, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. 
II-2969, 3104, 3064. 
 79. According to the OECD Global Forum on Competition and UNCTAD, 
economic efficiency, rather than other goals that may achieve the “public interest,” such 
as protecting small and medium-sized enterprises or cultural goals, is becoming 
increasingly important in competition systems all over the world. See, e.g., WANG 
XIAOYE, supra note 74, at 26–27; see also TOWNLEY, supra note 77, at 13. 
 80. John B. Kirkwood, The Goals of Antitrust: The Essence of Antitrust: 
Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers from Anticompetitive Conduct, 81 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2425, 2431–32 (2013). 
 81. Interview with a Chinese scholar on The Anti-Monopoly Law of China, in 
Beijing, China (Oct. 22, 2012) (pointing out that balancing all interests in the Chinese 
market may be a modality to achieve the “public interest”) (the scholar did not allow the 
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consumer welfare. Although the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007
identifies “public interest” as its final goal,82 there still exists an obvious 
question: Is the “public interest” in the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007
somewhat broader than consumer welfare? The second debate is that 
from the angle of Article 15(3): What was the core area of economic 
objectives in the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007, when Chinese 
legislators adopted the exemption to agreements among SMEs? 
Regarding the protection of competitors or effective competition, how 
could one guarantee fair competition and economic efficiency 
simultaneously in the Chinese market for privately owned SMEs and 
SOEs?83
It is essential to consider in detail SMEs’ functions on the “public 
interest.” First, as the main driving forces for increasing Chinese market 
activity,84 the existence of privately owned SMEs is conducive to 
improving consumer welfare. Second, privately owned SMEs create job 
opportunities and improve living standards for their employees, which 
contribute to the realization of social welfare.85 Third, because SOEs and 
researcher to use her name in any written work arising from the study, but did consent to 
being interviewed); see also Luo Zhaojing, Development of Abuse of Administrative 
Power to Eliminate or Restrict Competition in the Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s 
Republic of China and the Impact of Article 106 of EU Competition Law and Free 
Movement Rules (2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Glasgow). 
 82. See [The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China] art. 13–15. 
 83. See, e.g., Morris A. Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws,
61 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1289 (1948) (“Although the maintenance of effective, or 
‘workable,’ competition is generally considered as not the only, perhaps not even the 
most important, object of antitrust policy, exclusion of the wider social and political 
objects from this discussion . . . is more than a matter of mere convenience.”); see also
J.M. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 THE AM. ECON. REV. 241 
(1940).
 84. See PORTER, supra note 73. 
 85. By the end of 2008, Chinese SMEs were playing a vital role in employment. 
Since then, the SMEs’ proportion of total employment has accounted for over 75 percent. 
See, e.g., Huang Yufeng, WOGUO ZHONGXIAOXING QIYE DE JIEGOUXING KUNJING JI DUICE
YANJIU <(ᡃᅜ୰ᑠᆺ௻᷂䘬乻㜬⿏⚘⠫⍲⮡䫾䞼䨞)> [RESEARCH ON RESPONSE TO 
STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS IN CHINA’S SMES] 16 (2010).
2017] A Maze of Contradictions 515 
privately owned SMEs can be considered as two distinguishable types of 
enterprise in the Chinese market, an increase in privately owned SMEs 
could be the equivalent to a decrease in SOEs.86 The same argument 
applies to their interests, which may balance the current unbalanced 
situation between these two groups of enterprise. Consequently, apart 
from consumer welfare, privately owned SMEs can also promote other 
objectives of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007, such as welfare of 
employees and interests of enterprises, as well as balancing these 
objectives to ultimately realize the “public interest.”87
However, if protecting SME operators were one of the purposes of the 
Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007, the State could therefore be accused 
of giving executive protection and strong support to SME operators. In 
this case, the interests and welfare of SME operators would be 
particularly important in China. What if too many SMEs appeared in the 
market? Since SMEs are always associated with low efficiency, 
considering the interests and welfare of SMEs operators too much is not 
a very wise course of action in most instances. Therefore, although 
privately owned SMEs are eager for State intervention to improve their 
conditions, excessive protection for them would undermine effective 
competition in some sense.88
Conversely, if promoting effective competition were to be one of the 
State’s major objectives for supporting the development of SMEs, giving 
specific support to SMEs could be considered as a method of promoting 
Chinese economic development. A review of the State’s economic 
Table 5: Chinese SMEs’ Proportion of Total Non-Agricultural Employment 2008-
2011 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 
SMEs’ Proportion of Total Non-
Agricultural Employment (%) 78 75 80 Nearly 80 
CHINA POPULATION & EMPLOYMENT STATISTICAL Y.B. 2010 for 2008–2009 data, 
RESEARCH ON RESPONSE TO STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS IN CHINA’S SME for 2010 datum, 
RESEARCH REPORT ON CHINA’S SMES 2011 (2011) (table devised by the author). 
 86. See Shao, supra note 5. 
 87. WANG XIAOYE, supra note 74. 
 88. ZHONGGUO FANLONGDUANFA SHISHI REDIAN WENTI YANJIU [RESEARCH ON 
HOT ISSUES OF ENFORCEMENT OF CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW] 10 (Wang Xianlin ed., 
2011).
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development in the last century indicates that although SOEs may get 
China onto the fast track to success, privately owned SMEs are also one 
of the economic powers, one which cannot be ignored.89 Promoting 
effective competition under the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 will 
therefore offer an opportunity to achieve balanced economic growth: all 
kinds of Chinese enterprises will acquire a genuine opportunity to realize 
their realistic goals and enjoy the fair competition in the market. 
B. Challenges for Chinese Privately Owned SMEs – Disobedient 
SOEs and Administrative Agencies 
If understanding of the exemption to the agreements among SMEs 
(Article 15(3) of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007) could be 
considered an awareness issue, the inability of SMEs to stop SOEs and 
administrative agencies abusing their exclusive rights should be regarded 
as one of the legal mishaps of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007. For 
SOEs and administrative agencies, although the Chinese Anti-Monopoly 
Law 2007 does forbid the phenomenon of abusing dominant positions 
(Articles 7, 8 & 32–37),90 administrative powers ignore this requirement 
in order to create smooth-surface growth for SOEs.91 Such a trend may 
enhance the interests of SMEs over a limited time, as well as the State’s 
short-term interests. However, for the State’s sustainable and sound 
 89. Guanyu 1996 nian Guoqi Gaige Gongzuo de Shishi Yijian [Notice of 
Opinions on 1996’s SOE Reform Implementation] (promulgated by the St. Econ. & 
Trade Comm’n, Dec. 14, 1995, effective Jan. 1, 1996), 
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/shuju/1996/ gwyb199609.pdf (China) (pointing out “big is 
the best” has been to some extent shaken).  
 90. Article 8 of the Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China states, 
“[n]o administrative organ or organization empowered by a law or administrative 
regulation to administer public affairs may abuse its administrative powers to eliminate or 
restrict competition.” [The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China] art. 8. 
Articles 32–37 of the same Law reiterate that administrative organs or organizations must 
not abuse their administrative power to eliminate competition in the Chinese market. Id. 
art 32–37. 
91. See Angela Huyue Zhang, The Enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law in 
China: An Institutional Design Perspective, 56 ANTITRUST BULL. 631, 632 (2011). 
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development, it is not an intelligent choice.92 Therefore, EU competition 
law limits this phenomenon.93
However, on this issue in the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007, there 
are no genuine sanctions against SOEs and administrative agencies. 
When they make excessive administrative intervention in specific 
economic development activities in the market involving privately 
owned SMEs, the costs of violations are extremely low. Consequently, 
the following two sections aim to analyze the administrative powers 
within the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007, which is commonly abused 
in order to undermine the growth of privately owned SMEs in the 
market. 
1. Arrogant Chinese Administrative Agencies – A Lack of 
Restraint on the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 
In order to protect SOEs in traditional State-owned industries that are 
concerned with the lifeline of the national economy and security, many 
administrative agencies in China have been granted rights to intervene in 
economic development.94 The State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
 92. See Maurice E. Stucke, Are People Self-Interested? The Implications of 
Behavioral Economics on Competition Policy, in MORE COMMON GROUND FOR 
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW? 3, 15–20 (Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2011). 
 93. For example, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
effectively forbids undertakings abusing dominant positions. Consolidated Version of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 102, October 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. 
(C 326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. Article 106 of TFEU states that “[i]n the case of public 
undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant special or exclusive rights, 
Member States shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules 
contained in the Treaties . . ..” Id. art. 106. Case RTT v. GB-INNO-BM gave a brilliant 
example of the abuse of dominant positions. Case C-18/88, Régie des Télégraphes et des 
Téléphones (RTT) v. GB-Inno-BM SA, 1991 E.C.R. I-5973, ¶¶ 17–20. In this case, 
although the State law allowed the undertaking to have control over the ancillary market, 
this ran contrary to EU competition law. Id. ¶ 20. As a result, the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) forbade the abusive behavior of the public undertaking. Id. See also Case 
C-41/90, Höfner v. Macrotron GmbH, 1991 E.C.R. I-2010, ¶ 28; Case C-260/89, Elliniki 
Radiophonia Tileorassi Anonimi Etairia (ERT AE) v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis 
(DEP), 1991 E.C.R. I-2951, ¶ 31; Case C-185/91, Bundesanstalt für den 
Güterfernverkehr v Gebrüder Reiff GmbH&Co. KG, 1993 E.C.R. I-5841, ¶ 14; Wentong 
Zheng, State-Owned Enterprises Versus the State: Lessons from Trade Law, in
COMPETITION AND THE STATE 75, 76 (Thomas K. Cheng et al. eds., 2014). 
 94. WANG, supra note 63, at 288.  
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Administration Commission of the State Council of China (SASAC), the 
supreme governing body of State assets, is one of those agencies.95
Chinese local governments, which would be granted rights to supervise 
the local industrial structure and the growth of SOEs within their 
administrative territory, become additional administrative agencies with 
the ability to bring about economic intervention. However, their 
interventions, which focus on their own areas and interests, may disturb 
fair competition in the relevant market.96 Therefore, the Chinese Anti-
Monopoly Law 2007 ought to provide adequate restrictions over these 
agencies. Disappointingly, hitherto those administrative agencies which 
have the right to intervene in the market have acted outside the Chinese 
Anti-Monopoly Law 2007.
Because the SASAC and local governments can simply ignore the
Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 in the restructuring process of SOEs,97
they easily undermine privately owned SMEs. For example, one year 
before the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 was launched, the SASAC 
published an additional SOE policy, titled ‘Guiding Opinions of the 
State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the 
State Council about Promoting the Adjustment of State-Owned Capital 
and the Reorganization of State-Owned Enterprises’ (2006), on the 
organization of SOEs.98 On the one hand, this policy was intended to 
enliven the State-owned SMEs and to establish a withdrawal mechanism 
for inferior enterprises. On the other hand, this policy was also 
 95. The main functions of the SASAC are supervising and managing central 
SOEs, performing investor’s responsibilities for the state-owned assets, pushing forward 
the reform and restructuring of SOEs, improving corporate governance, propelling the 
strategic adjustment of the structure of the Chinese economy, and so on. Main Functions,
SASAC, CHINA, http://en.sasac.gov.cn/n1408028/n1408521/index.html (last visited Apr. 
11, 2017). 
 96. Song Shengxia, supra note 53. 
 97. See generally Sebastian Heilmann, Experience First, Laws Later: 
Experimentation and Breakthroughs in the Restructuring of China’s State Sector, in
GOING PRIVATE IN CHINA: THE POLITICS OF CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING AND SYSTEM 
REFORM 95, 98–103 (Jean Oi ed., 2011). 
 98. Guanyu Yuijin Guoyou Ziben Tiaozheng he Guoyou Qiye Chongzu de 
Zhidao Yijian, [Guiding Opinions of the State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council about Promoting the Adjustment of 
State-Owned Capital and the Reorganization of State-Owned Enterprises] (promulgated 
by the State Council, Dec. 5, 2006, effective Dec. 5, 2006), 
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2007/ content_503385.htm.  
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committed to speeding up the restructuring of large-scale SOEs and 
improving the approval procedures for them.99 Accordingly, the SASAC 
grants excessive administrative rights to local governments (at or above 
the prefectural level) and they use their excessive power and rights to 
intervene in the restructuring of local SOEs. However, at the same time, 
there is hardly any Chinese law or legal authority that has a legitimate 
remit to constrain such excessive administrative intervention. Even 
worse, although there was hope that after the Chinese Anti-Monopoly 
Law 2007 was enacted, this irrational situation would gradually 
disappear, the reality was to the contrary: SOEs have simply become 
larger and larger (see Figure 6 below),100 and are squeezing the economic 
space for privately owned SMEs to operate in local markets.101 Because 
the merger of local SOEs may reduce competition level in the relevant 
market, local privately owned SMEs probably have to face the fact that 
their survival conditions will get progressively worse. The restructuring 
 99. Id.
 100. National Data, NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA (May 8, 2017), 
http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.htm?cn=C0 (figure devised by author). Because 
SOEs are selected winners created by State intervention, protected SOEs are unable to 
grow significantly. Although Figure 6 shows how much progress was made in the assets 
of State-held industrial enterprises between 2004 and 2011, the return on equity (ROE) of 
SOEs was only close to one half of that of non-SOEs in the second half of the first decade 
of the 21st century (see Table 7 below). 
Table 7: ROE of Chinese SOEs and the Private Sector between 2006 and 2010 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
ROE of SOEs (%) 15.53 16.97 12.42 11.42 16.07 
ROE of the Private Sector (%) 22.12 26.08 30.06 26.36 32.59 
Id. (table devised by the author); see generally U.N. Conference on Trade and 
Development, Ifran ul Haque, Discussion Papers: Rethinking Industrial Policy,
UNCTAD/OSG/DP/2007/2 (Apr. 2007); see also Main Economic Indicators of State-
Holding Industrial Enterprises by Industrial Sector (2003-2011), NATIONAL BUREAU OF 
STATISTICS OF CHINA (March 5, 2015), http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/ 
easyquery.htm?cn=C01; see also Zhao Changwen, Guoqi Xiaolv Wenti Touxi <(ᅜ௻ᩀ
⋡斖桀德㜸)> [An Efficiency Analysis of SOEs], 15 PEOPLE’S TRIBUNE, CHINA 32 (2012). 
 101. See, e.g., Development Research Center of the State Council, ZHONGXIAO 
QIYE FAZHAN [THE DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES] 6 (2011); see 
also ZHONGGUO JINGJI GAIGE 30 NIAN: MINYING JINGJI JUAN (1978–2008) [CHINA’S 30
YEARS OF REFORM: VOL. OF THE PRIVATE ECONOMY 1978-2008] 218–20 (Zhou Liqun & 
Xie Siquan eds. 2008). 
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in the Chinese steel industry could easily demonstrate this unwelcome 
prospect.102
Figure 6: Assets of State-Holding Industrial Enterprises 2004–2011 
(RMB 100 million Yuan) 
Second, the SASAC seeks a legal basis in the Chinese Anti-Monopoly 
Law 2007 to cover illegal intervention in central SOEs. In 2003, the 
SASAC announced that the structural adjustment of central SOEs should 
be improved by reducing their total number.103 However, at the present 
time (2015), the SASAC has not yet achieved its targets.104 There are still 
 102. In Hebei province, China, the provincial government aimed to merge and 
decrease both State-owned and privately owned steel enterprises located in the province, 
from over 200 in 2003 to 15 by the end of 2015, without considering market rules. See
[Steel Industry Revitalization Plan of China]; see also supra text accompanying note 41. 
 103. YONG ZHEN, CHINA’S CAPITAL MARKETS 210 (2013).
 104. According to the SASAC, the number of central SOEs ought to have shrunk 
by at least 34% and dropped to 80–100 by the end of 2010. Additionally, this figure 
would be further reduced in the period of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan. It was expected 
that the number of central SOEs should be within the range of thirty to fifty. See, e.g. Li
Rongrong, Guoziwei: 2007 Zhongguo Zhongyang Qiye Jiang Jiasu Chongzu [The SASAC 
will Accelerate the Restructuring of Central SOEs in 2007], CENT. PEOPLE’S GOV’T
CHINA (Jan. 19, 2007), http://www.china.com.cn/policy/txt/2007-
01/19/content_7681508.htm; see also Li Baomin, Shierwu Qijian Zhongdian Gaige 
Longduan Hangye Guoyou Qiye [Deepening SOE Reform in Monopoly Industries during 
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112 central SOEs in China.105 After reviewing this State-oriented 
structural adjustment of central SOEs, we can assert that there were both 
positive and negative impacts arising from the Chinese Anti-Monopoly 
Law 2007.
The positive aspect has been that in the process of the adjustment, the 
SASAC, with the aim of turning central SOEs into completely market-
oriented enterprises in the following 10–15 years,106 has not completely 
ignored market mechanisms: in this process, the SASAC intends firstly 
to ensure the quality of the adjustment, rather than the quantity of central 
SOEs. Thus, the intended reduction in the number of central SOEs has 
not been achieved. 
However, the negative aspect has been that, despite the Chinese Anti-
Monopoly Law 2007 coming into force in 2008, the SASAC removed 
nearly all legal restrictions to SOE mergers. In relation to the SASAC’s 
attitude, the SASAC alone and different levels of Chinese government 
control mergers between, or among, central SOEs and local SOEs. This 
is puzzling to officers working in the anti-monopoly agencies when 
considering the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007.107 On the one hand, 
the officers consider that SOEs ought to comply with the Chinese Anti-
Monopoly Law 2007. On the other hand, the officers also hold that the 
Constitution of China 2004108 and the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law
2007109 give special protection to SOEs.  
the Twelfth Five-Year Period], CHINA ECON. NET (Oct. 30, 2010), 
http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/zg/201010/30/t20101030_21930576.shtml. 
 105. Zhongyang Qiye Minglu [The List of Chinese Central SOEs], SASAC, CHINA
(Mar. 15, 2015), http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1226/n2425/. 
 106. Tian Zhiming, Guoziwei Mingque Yangqi Gaige Silu: Yangqi Jiang Xishu 
Shangshi [The SASAC Made the Idea of Central SOE Reform Clear: How to Become 
Listed Companies], SOUTHERN DAILY, CHINA, Feb. 24, 2011, at A16. 
 107. See, e.g., ZHONG GANG, FANLONGDUANFA HUOMIAN ZHIDU YANJIU [ON THE 
EXEMPTION IN ANTI-MONOPOLY LAWS] 58 (2010); see also Thomas R. Howell et al., 
China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law: A Perspective from the United States, 18 PAC. RIM L.
& POL’Y J. 53, 90 (2009). 
 108. Article 7 of the Constitution of China 2004 affirms that “the State ensures the 
consolidation and growth of the State economy.” XIANFA art. 7, (2004) (China). 
 109. [The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated 
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008) 
2007 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 68, art. 7, 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471587.htm (mentioning 
that for the sake of national or economic security, this Law protects the State economy); 
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However, such statements must be questioned, when pursuing the 
final objectives and purposes of the Constitution of China 2004 and the 
Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007.110 The SASAC should not 
indiscriminately use administrative powers and rights to intervene in the 
restructuring of SOEs.111 Both the Constitution and the Anti-Monopoly 
Law in China exist to advance the protection of the sound and rapid 
development of the national economy, not the safeguarding of the State’s 
short-term interest. Though the core reason that the SASAC proposes to 
strengthen SOEs’ development is to ensure national or economic 
security, SOEs’ prosperity does not necessarily equate to the blooming of 
the national economy. Pessimistically speaking, the actual 
competitiveness of SOEs, which have been developing fast under State 
intervention, could not be strong enough.112 SOEs, as market 
participants,113 ought to strictly follow the market rules and laws114 like 
other participants. However, administrative agencies that have the power 
to intervene the market often favor SOEs in the name of State interest.115
Thus, with regard to the competition between SOEs and privately owned 
SMEs, if SOEs and administrative agencies ever step out of line, the 
Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 will sooner or later counter-attack. 
Consequently, the core rules in the Chinese market should follow the 
see also Li Rongrong, Guoqi Gaige Fabuhui [SOE Reform Press Conference], CHINA 
CENTRAL TELEVISION (Aug. 10, 2008), 
http://news.cctv.com/china/20080810/105950.shtml. 
 110. Interview with Chinese scholar in Beijing, China (Oct. 21, 2012) (the scholar 
did not allow the researcher to use his name in any written work arising from the study, 
but did consent to being interviewed); see also Zhen Qinggui, Guoqi Gaizhi Gaige Bixu 
Yifa Jingxing [State-Owned Enterprise Reform Must be Carried out According to Law], 
37 CHINA ECON. WKLY. 16 (2014). 
 111. See, e.g., Thomas R. Howell et al., China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law: A 
Perspective from the United States, 18 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 53, 84 (2009); see also
HARRIS ET AL., supra note 66, at 24. 
 112. See, e.g., Gao Xu, State-Owned Enterprises in China: How Big are They?,
WORLD BANK (Jan. 19, 2010), http://blogs.worldbank.org/eastasiapacific/state-owned-
enterprises-in-china-how-big-are-they; see also Gabriel Wildau, Chinese Economy Slows 
Again as Beijing Seeks New Path to Growth, FIN. TIMES (Asia), Apr. 16, 2015, at 1. 
 113. Sun Jin Zhangtian, Guanyu Fanlongduanfa dui Longduan Guoqi Shiyong 
Wenti de Sikao [Reflections on the Application of Anti-Monopoly Law to Monopoly State-
Owned Enterprises], 8 FAZHI YANJIU 51 (2014). 
 114. See, e.g., id.
 115. WANG, supra note 63, at 288. 
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Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007, which ought not to sit idly by and 
allow such a situation to continue.116
However, regrettably, things have not turned out the expected way. 
The semi-government-oriented economic growth model is hard to shake 
in China. The SASAC has drifted even further and further down that 
road, and put forward a development plan for the mergers of SOEs at the 
end of 2011 and beginning of 2012 (the SASAC’s development plan). 
For the purposes of expansion, the “joint power” of the State-owned 
economy, the SASAC stresses complementary advantages and the 
powerful combination of central SOEs and local SOEs.117 It is not 
difficult to foresee that the integration of the State-owned assets will be 
bound to bring about mergers and monopolies in the Chinese market.118
 116. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 66, at xii (maintaining that the Chinese Anti-
Monopoly Law is “known as the Economic Charter”). 
 117. Until September 2013, approximately fifteen of Chinese provincial 
governments, such as Zhejiang, Guangxi, Shanxi, Qinghai, etc. had signed a 
[Cooperation Memorandum] with SASAC and several framework agreements with some 
central SOEs. See, e.g., Qu Lili (᭤ᷥᷥ), Guoziwei Antui Yangqi Zhenghe Difang Guozi 
Gouzhu Jianguan Dageju (ᅜ峬⥼䦀⭮㍐≐⚥㚱ᷕ⣖ẩ᷂␴⛘㕡⚥㚱ẩ᷂䘬ᶨỻ⊾)
[The SASAC Secretly Pushes the Integration of the State-Controlled Central Enterprises 
and Local SOEs], CHINA BUS. J., Jan. 16, 2012, at A2; see also Guowuyuan Guoziwei yu 
Zhejiang Shengzhengfu Qianshu Hezuo Beiwanglu (ᅜ峬⥼ᶶ㴁㰇䚩Ṣ㮹㓧⹄䬦会Ḯ⎰
ἄ⢯⾀)[The SASAC Signed a Cooperation Memorandum with the People’s Government 
of Zhejiang], SASAC, CHINA (Dec. 27, 2011), 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1566/n259730/n264168/14179369.html.  
 118. For instance, since 2013, the cooperation between central SOEs (e.g. China 
Minmetals Corporation, China Railway Materials Company Limited, Sinosteel 
Corporation, etc.) and Hebei Iron and Steel Group Company Limited (a provincial SOE) 
has enhanced the upstream-downstream cooperation in the steel industry in Hebei market 
and squeezed the living space of other local competitors. Furthermore, in Hubei Province, 
Wuhan Iron and Steel (Group) Corporation (a central SOE) has wholly owned Echeng 
Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. (a provincial SOE) from 2013 onward. See, e.g., Wang Daojun, 
Duijie Yangqi de Quanguo Chongdong (௕஦୚୰ኸᅜ᭷௻᷂䘬⎰ἄ) [Being Engaged 
in the Cooperation with Central SOEs] 3 SHANGHAI GUOZI [CAPITAL SHANGHAI, CHINA]
52 (2010); see also Chen Hongxia, Hubeisheng Touzi Gongsi Tuichu, Wugang Jituan 
Quanpan Jieshou Egang (ᅜᘙ⍹㈽峬℔⎠炷㷾⊿↮℔⎠炸㷾⊿↮℔⎠㈽峬℔⎠␴㬎
㯱摊摩炷普⚊炸℔⎠ℐ峬⫸℔⎠悪❶摊摩᭷㝈බྖ) [Wuhan Iron and Steel Group 
Took Over E-Hubei Hubei], 21ST CENTURY BUS. HERALD (May 22, 2013); see also Lei 
Hanfa et al., Hebei Gangtie Jituan yu Yangqi Zhanlve Hezuo Zaihuo Xinjinzhan (Ἑ໭摊
摩普⚊㚱旸℔⎠ᶶᷕ⣖⚥㚱ẩ᷂⎰ἄ徃ℍ㕘旞㭝) [The Cooperation between Hebei 
Iron and Steel Group Company Limited and Central SOEs Reaches a New Stage], CHINA 
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However, the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 seems to contain no 
genuine sanctions or remedies to prevent this phenomenon happening. 
2. Impregnable Administrative Powers – The Chinese Anti-
Monopoly Law 2007 has a Long Way to Go 
Unrestrained administrative intervention over almost all kinds of 
enterprise growth, and even the State’s economic development, somehow 
exist in China. The phenomenon such as the SASAC’s development plan 
on the cooperation among local governments, central SOEs and local 
SOEs, remains in force, and continues to have influence on the 
effectiveness of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007. Since the Anti-
Monopoly Law 2007 has not imposed genuine sanctions against 
administrative agencies that provide the inappropriate intervention to the 
market, it has become one of the worst and saddest realities that this Law 
has to face. 
According to Article 51(1) of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007,
there are two “punishment” methods for administrative agencies and 
their officers where either plays a part in abusing administrative power to 
restrict competition in the market.119 The first is that the superior 
authority120 shall order the lower-level authorities that issue excessive 
ECON. NET (May 23, 2013, 3:31 PM), 
http://district.ce.cn/zg/201305/23/t20130523_24413113.shtml. 
 119. [Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008) STANDING 
COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG., art. 51 (China). 
 120. The superior authorities, which issue excessive administrative directives, are 
the heads of those lower-level authorities (see figure 8 below): 
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administrative directives to make correction of their illegal behavior.121
The second is that the “superior authority shall impose punishments on 
the directly liable person(s)-in-charge and other directly liable 
persons”122 However, without specific penalties, these two methods 
cannot effectively crack down on either administrative agencies or the 
directly liable person. Therefore, the two methods of punishment of 
administrative authorities and officers cannot ensure the smooth 
implementation of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007.123
There is a further problem. Article 51(1) mentions that “[t]he anti-
monopoly authority may put forward suggestions on handling [of cases] 
according to law to the relevant superior authority.”124 Administrative 
Figure 8: A Sample of the Organizational Structure of the State Council of China 
See State Council Organization Chart, STATE COUNCIL OF CHINA (Aug. 28, 2014, 1:17 
PM), http://english.gov.cn/state_council/2014/09/03/content_281474985533579.htm  
(figure devised by the author).  
 121. See Stefan Weishaar, Administrative Monopolies, State Aid, Barriers to Entry 
and Market Integration: Challenges for the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, in
COMPETITION POLICY AND REGULATION: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA, THE US AND 
EUROPE 98, 120 (Michael Faure & Xinzhu Zhang eds., 2011). 
 122. [The Anti-Monopoly Law of China 2007]. 
 123. The Present Situation and Development of Chinese Competition Law and 
Policy and Practice, in Competition Policy and Law Commission of China Society for 
World Trade Organization Studies 173 (2010). 
 124. [The Anti-Monopoly Law of China 2007] art. 51. 
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agencies have frequently used appropriate125 or inappropriate126
interventions in the market. However, it is rarely heard that any superior 
authority carries out supervision and inspection of the lower-level 
authorities127 when such violations have occurred.128
In order to solve this problem, the first judicial interpretation of the 
Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 (‘Regulation on Several Issues 
Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Dispute Cases 
arising from Monopolistic Conducts’ [2012]) was came into force on 
June 1, 2012. This judicial interpretation clearly expressed the view that, 
in China, natural persons, legal persons, and other organizations could 
bring a civil action against those who issue inappropriate administrative 
directives that adversely affect their growth.129 According to Article 9 of 
 125. The author assumes that appropriate interventions mean that Chinese 
administrative agencies use their powers effectively to enhance competition and ensure 
sound and sustainable economic development. 
 126. The author assumes that inappropriate interventions in this article mean that 
Chinese administrative agencies abuse their powers to obstruct non-SOEs and interrupt 
competition in the market with a view to protecting SOEs and temporary State interest. 
 127. In 2014, the [Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau] investigated the 
Hebei provincial government on its local protection conduct for the first time. See Song, 
supra note 53. 
 128. Article 30 of the Law of China against Unfair Competition 1993 provides a 
similar right for superior authorities when their subordinate authorities abuse their 
administrative powers in the economy. However, although the SAIC investigated and 
prosecuted over 500 administrative monopoly cases under the Law of China against 
Unfair Competition 1993 between 1995 and 2005, no inappropriate intervention had been 
corrected and no directly liable person had been punished. See, e.g., WANG XIAOYE,
JINGZHENGFAXUE [COMPETITION LAW] 393 (2007); see also Zhou Dongxu, Wang Xiaoye: 
Xingzheng Longduan Anjian Weihe Hanjian [Why Administrative Monopoly Cases are 
Uncommon], CAIXIN ONLINE (Sept. 15, 2014), http://m.opinion.caixin.com/pad/2014-09-
15/100728745.html; see also THE FAIR TRADING BUREAU OF THE SAIC AND CASS
RESEARCH CENTRE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, FANLONGDUAN DIANXING ANLI JI ZHONGGUO 
FANLONGDUAN ZHIFA DIAOCHA [SELECTED ANTI-MONOPOLY CASES AND INVESTIGATION 
AND ANALYSIS ON THE CHINESE ADMINISTRATIVE ANTI-MONOPOLY ENFORCEMENT]
Introduction (2007); see also WANG, supra note 63, at 356–57; see also [The Law of 
China against Unfair Competition 1993] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Sept. 2, 1993, effective Dec. 1, 1993) art. 30, 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383803.htm. 
 129. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli yin Longduan Xingwei Yinfa de 
Minshi Jiufen Anjian Yingyong Falv Ruogan Wenti de Guiding <(᭱㧗ேẸἲ㝔යன⭉
䎮⚈✬㕕埴ᷢ⺽⍹䘬㮹ḳ么也㟰ẞ⸼䓐㱽⼳劍⸚斖桀䘬奬⭂)> [Regulation on 
Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Dispute Cases 
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this judicial interpretation,130 the People’s Court may assume dominant 
positions of the defendants in the relevant markets based on the specific 
market structure and competitive circumstance, unless there is sufficient 
evidence to invalidate such a finding.131 This Article grants much 
decision-making power to the People’s Courts in China in a highly 
specialized area.132 However, the decision-making power has a double-
sided nature. Without genuine use and necessary restriction, it may be 
hard to uphold the principle of fairness. Because the People’s Courts 
cannot be regarded as an independent law enforcement agency,133 some 
Arising from Monopolistic Conducts] (promulgated by the Judicial Comm. of the 
Supreme People’s Court, Jan. 30, 2012, effective June 1, 2012), 
http://www.court.gov.cn/qwfb/sfjs/201205/ t20120509_176785.htm; see also The Anti-
Monopoly Law of China 2007, art. 50 (“Where any loss was caused by a business 
operator’s monopolistic conducts to other entities and individuals, the business operator 
shall assume the civil liabilities.”). 
 130. [Regulation on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial 
of Civil Dispute Cases Arising from Monopolistic Conducts]. 
 131. Under Article 9 of [Regulation on Several Issues Concerning the Application 
of Law in the Trial of Civil Dispute Cases arising from Monopolistic Conducts], a public
utility with a statutory monopoly can be directly defined as having a dominant market 
position in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Based on the policy of [The SAIC’s 
Responding to How to Identify Other Operators Occupying Monopoly Status According 
to Law] (2000), statutory monopoly means that the operator is the only one, or exists with 
insufficient competition, in the relevant market. Therefore, if the Chinese fixed-
broadband industry is examined, the SOEs’ dominant position cannot be defined directly 
because China Telecom and Unicom are, on the surface, “effective competitors” created 
by the State. And relevant privately owned SMEs must provide evidence of their 
dominant positions for private anti-monopoly lawsuits. See, e.g., id; see also WANG,
supra note 63, at 381–82; see also KONG XIANGJUN ET AL. EDS., FANBUZHENGDANG 
JINGZHENGFA: YUANLI, GUIZE, ANLI [THE CHINESE ANTI-UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW:
PRINCIPLES, RULES & CASES] 134 (2006). 
 132. Ma Guangyuan, Shekeyuan Zhuanjia: Minzhong Qisu Longduan Qiye Yiran 
Kunnan Chongchong [The Academy of Social Sciences Experts: People to Prosecute the 
Monopoly is Still Difficult], CHINA BROADCASTING NETWORK (May 9, 2012), 
http://www.antimonopolylaw.org/article/default.asp?id=3785. 
 133. In the area of competition law, such a situation not only exists in China, but 
also appeared in the United States. Professor Grimes mentioned that “the court has failed 
on its role to carefully examine economic policy arguments because of the unprincipled 
way in which it mixes arguments based on state desire or precedent with economic 
analysis.” Donald Clarke et al., The Role of Law in China’s Economic Development, in
CHINA’S GREAT ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 375 (Loren Brandt & Thomas G Rawski, 
2008); see also Williams, supra note 66, at 96; see also Warren S. Grimes, Fifteen Years 
of Supreme Court Antitrust Jurisprudence: The Defendant Always Wins, in THE 
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anti-monopoly lawsuits involving large-scale SOEs, which implement 
inappropriate administrative interventions, may turn into administrative 
issues. Therefore, providing workable legal limitations for administrative 
agencies and SOEs which abuse their exclusive rights is difficult for the
Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 to achieve when the People’s Courts 
can intervene. It remains difficult for privately owned SMEs to turn their 
situations from hopeless to hopeful when facing administrative 
interventions.
The fact that there are no genuine sanctions against those who issue 
inappropriate administrative directives to the market is another major 
legal flaw in the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007.134 However, the 
Chinese administrative laws and regulations that ought to remedy this 
legal flaw do not seek to effectively confine or prohibit administrative 
agencies or their officers if they abuse their administrative power135 and 
thereby restrict competition in the market.136
In detail, there are two ways to look for protection from 
administrative laws and regulations in China: administrative lawsuits and 
administrative reconsiderations.137 According to Article 13(1) of ‘The 
DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION LAW: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 30 (Roger Zäch et al. eds., 
2010).
 134. All Articles of the [Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007], which relate to the 
abuse of administrative powers, are general principles of the prohibition without any 
specific sanctions. The approach of “the superior authority punishment and correction” 
(Article 51 of the [Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007]) is ineffective and requires a 
strong support from the administrative laws and regulations. See YU LIANGCHUN, FAN 
XINGZHENGXING LONGDUAN YU CUJIN JINGZHENG ZHENGCE QIANYAN WENTI YANJIU 
[STUDY ON NEW RESEARCH FRONTIERS IN ANTI-ADMINISTRATIVE MONOPOLY AND 
COMPETITION POLICIES] 129–31 (2008). 
 135. GUAN BAOYING, HUANG HUI & CAO JIE, XINGZHENG LONGDUAN ZHI 
XINGZHENGFA GUIZHI [REGULATING ADMINISTRATIVE MONOPOLY TOWARD THE CHINESE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW] 98 (2008). 
 136. The Law of China against Unfair Competition 1993 presented a similar 
situation. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 137. In China, there are two types of administrative actions, “the specific 
administrative action” and “the abstract administrative action.” “The specific 
administrative action,” which can be challenged by administrative lawsuits, is a form of 
behavior with the aim of regulating specific people when they do specific things. “The 
abstract administrative action,” which cannot be challenged by administrative lawsuits, is 
a form of behavior with the aim of formulating binding rules for non-specific people and 
things. For instance, “[t]he people’s courts shall not accept actions initiated by citizens, 
legal persons or other organizations concerning any of the following matters: 
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Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues of 
Administrative Procedure Law of China’ [2001], “the specific 
administrative action” relating to fair competition can be challenged.138
However, the Administrative Procedure Law of China 1989 does not 
offer suitable protection for the aggrieved party.139 In the case of the 
SASAC’s development plans on mergers of SOEs in the 2010s,140 for 
…Administrative rules and regulations, or decisions and orders with general binding 
force formulated and promulgated by administrative organs….” See, e.g., [The 
Administrative Procedure Law of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Apr. 4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990), art. 12, 
http://www.china.org.cn/government/laws/2007-04/16/content_1207336.htm; see also
[The Law of China on Administrative Reconsideration] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 29, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999), 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/11/content_1383562.htm. 
Article 7: If citizens, legal persons or other organizations 
consider illegal the following provisions, which the 
administrative organs take as the basis for their specific 
administrative acts, they may also apply for examination of these 
provisions when applying for administrative reconsideration of 
the said acts: 
(1)  provisions formulated by departments under the State 
Council;
(2)    provisions formulated by local people’s governments at 
or above the county level and the department under them; and 
(3)  provisions formulated by township or town people’s 
governments.
The provisions listed in the preceding paragraph do not include 
rules and regulations formulated by the ministries and 
commissions under the State Council or by local people’s 
governments. The examination of rules and regulations shall be 
carried out in accordance with laws and administrative 
regulations.
 138. [The Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues of 
Administrative Procedure Law of China 2001] (promulgated by the Jud. Comm. of the 
Sup. People’s Ct., Nov. 24, 1999, effective Mar. 10, 2000).  
 139. The Present Situation and Development of Chinese Competition Law and 
Policy and Practice, supra note 123, at 174. 
 140. The SASAC has launched a series of development plans on mergers of SOEs 
from 2010 onward to reduce the number of Chinese SOEs and enhance their 
comprehensive strength. See supra text accompanying note 95. Since 2014, SOE reform 
has been improved, and the introduction of private funds into SOEs is the basis of a new 
mixed-ownership reform in China. See, e.g., Lv Hongqiao, Huoqi Hebing Chongzu Lidu 
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privately owned market participants who may hope to protect themselves 
from these plans, the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 cannot safeguard 
their interests.141 Similarly, neither can Chinese administrative laws and 
regulations do anything useful because the cooperation between central 
SOEs and local governments or local SOEs, belonging to “the abstract 
administrative action,”142 cannot be challenged by administrative 
lawsuits.143 Thus, administrative reconsideration becomes the only 
protection method for privately owned market participants. However, 
because bureaucrats traditionally tend to shield one another, the 
administrative reconsideration would be a long and fruitless road for 
privately owned SMEs. 
As a result, since there is an absence of genuine sanctions to combat 
excessive administrative directives, the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 
2007 cannot prevent administrative agencies and SOEs from abusing 
their exclusive rights to interfere in the market. Victims of privately 
owned SMEs who suffer from the abuse of these rights have rarely 
attracted attention from the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007.144 Even 
Jingren, Huo Jianshao Liuqicheng [A Shocking Process in SOE Merger and Acquisition, 
The Total Number of Chinese SOEs May Decline by 60-70 Percent], CHINESE RADIO 
NETWORK (Jan. 6, 2015, 8:46 a.m.), 
http://finance.cnr.cn/txcj/20150106/t20150106_517319785.shtml. 
 141. The SASAC’s development plans to merge SOEs have been following 
administrative directives rather than [The Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007]. The 
administrative enhancement of SOEs lowers competitiveness of privately owned market 
participants and thereby reduces their economic interests. Focusing on a recent action on 
mergers of SOEs, namely the new mixed-ownership reform plan, the Central 
Government of China may benefit from private funds, with the aim of improving SOEs. 
Liu Liliang, Jin Shixiang Guoqi Gaige Fangan Youwang Shuaixian Chutai [Nearly Ten 
SOE Reform Programs are Expected to Come into Force], ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN BAO 
[CHINA SECURITIES JOURNAL] (Jan. 28, 2015), http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20150128/ 
011921412356.shtml.
 142. GUAN, supra note 135, at 9–10. 
 143. [The Administrative Procedure Law of China], (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990), art. 12, 
http://www.china.org.cn/government/laws/2007-04/16/content_1207336.htm; [The Law 
of China on Administrative Reconsideration] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Apr. 29, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999), art. 7, 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/11/content_1383562.htm. 
 144. For example, the Hebei government aimed to merge and decrease both State-
owned and privately owned steel enterprises located in the province, without considering 
market rules. In this process, all shutdown and merged steel enterprises can be described 
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worse, a source of possible external assistance, namely administrative 
laws and regulations, is unable to assist in restricting the administrative 
power. In summary, privately owned SMEs have been subjected to unfair 
treatment over a long period of time. Why does inappropriate 
administrative intervention continue to be a very stubborn phenomenon 
in China? Analysis of the legal flaws in the Chinese Law on Promotion 
of SMEs 2002 and the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 may offer a 
partial answer, but not a complete answer. Alternatively, the inherent 
tension between the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 and the State’s 
industrial policy may provide a useful explanation for the weak survival 
conditions of privately owned SMEs. 
III. INHERENT TENSION BETWEEN THE CHINESE ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW
2007 AND THE STATE’S INDUSTRIAL POLICY ON THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF PRIVATELY OWNED SMES
Starting in 1978, China enacted a considerable number of policies for 
SMEs’ development.145 However, a dedicated legal framework for SMEs 
has little more than ten years’ history in China, starting with the Chinese 
Law on Promotion of SMEs 2002. The growth of SMEs, a desire to 
increase practical cooperation between the new legal framework for 
those SMEs and the States’ industrial policy, and even the State economy 
remain tricky issues. Although the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 and 
as victims suffering inappropriate administrative interventions. See, e.g., CAO ET AL.,
supra note 135; see also Chen Yanpeng, Guojin Mintui Zhishang: Shuishi Zuihou de 
Shouhaizhe? [Casualties of the State Advances while the Private Sector Retreats: Who 
Are the Last Victims], CHINA TIMES (Dec 25, 2009, 10:41 PM), 
http://www.chinatimes.cc/article/9880.html.
 145. For example, “the Reform and Opening Up” Policy (1978) started a new era 
in China: moving the State’s attention from class struggle-oriented to economic 
construction-oriented. The publication “Preliminary Views on Economic Reform” (1980) 
held that China’s economy was based on public ownership and diversified other 
ownership structures. The “Grasp the Big, Release the Small” policy (1995) meant the 
State focused on a few large-scale SOEs that were concerned with the lifeline of the 
national economy and national security, while it released the rest of the SOEs, especially 
State-owned SMEs, pushed them into the market, and allowed bankruptcy and 
privatization. See, e.g., 30th Anniversary of China’s Reform and Opening-Up: Third 
Plenary Session of 11th Central Committee of CPC Held in 1978, PEOPLE’S DAILY 
ONLINE (Oct. 9, 2008), http://en.people.cn/90002/95589/6512371.html. 
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the State’s industrial policy have similar functions and final objective,146
in other words the “public interest,” conflict between them remains. This 
tendency has not only undermined the authority of the Chinese Anti-
Monopoly Law 2007, but has also granted privileges to SOEs and 
administrative agencies and threatened the growth of privately owned 
SMEs. Consequently, based on such a phenomenon, the following 
section of this article devotes considerable attention to the competition 
between the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 and industrial policies, 
from two aspects: first, because the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007
and industrial policies rely on different approaches to realize the 
resources allocated and avoid market failure, conflicts between them 
exist; and second, the tension between the Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 and 
the State’s industrial policy147 will be examined from the perspective of 
the definition and position of the “public interest” in both of them.148
 146. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Government Failure vs. Market Failure: 
Principles of Regulation, in GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF 
REGULATION 35 (Edward J. Balleisen & Davia A. Moss eds., 2012) (“[I]n principle there 
are government interventions that would be welfare enhancing.”). 
 147. See, e.g., COMPETITION AND THE STATE 2 (Thomas K. Cheng et al. eds., 2014) 
(“[C]ompetition authorities for the most part played only a minor role in the formulation 
of these policies.”). 
 148. In recent years, “public interest” has become a popular phrase in China. It 
appears in various laws and regulations, such as the [Civil Law of China 1986], the 
[Contract Law of China 1999], the [Property Law of China 2007], the [Administrative 
Permission Law of China 2003], and so on. However, hitherto, “public interest” has not 
had a clear definition. Although the [Trust Law of China 2001] and the [Law of China on 
Donations for Public Welfare 1999] have outlined the scope of the “public interest,” they 
are unable to provide a clear definition for this phrase in the [Chinese Anti-Monopoly 
Law 2007]. See, e.g., [General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of 
China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, 
effective Jan. 1, 1987), art. 7, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-
12/12/content_1383941.htm (Article 7 Civil activities shall have respect for social ethics 
and shall not harm the public interest, undermine State economic plans or disrupt social 
economic order). See also [Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 1999, effective Oct. 
1, 1999), art. 52, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-
12/11/content_1383564.htm (“Article 52 A contract is invalid in any of the following 
circumstances: . . . (4) harm is done to social and public interests.”). 
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A. Different Approaches to Realizing Resource Allocation and the 
Avoidance of Market Failure 
In China, it is generally considered that the Chinese Anti-Monopoly 
Law 2007 and the State’s industrial policy have the same functions in the 
area of the State’s economic development: they are both devoted to 
ensuring an efficient allocation of resources and the avoidance of market 
failure.149 However, this does not mean that the Chinese Anti-Monopoly 
Law 2007 and the State’s industrial policy are sufficiently similar that 
conflict is avoided.150 In order to enhance economic efficiency151 and 
avoid market failure, the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 relies on the 
market mechanisms, whereas industrial policy aims to achieve such 
functions by administrative intervention. Although different roads can 
lead to the same goals, in the process of achieving those goals conflict is 
inevitable.
1. Market Mechanisms – The Ideal Trump Card for the 
Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 
Because China has not been a traditional market economy country 
since 1949, the State’s demands have often determined to a large extent 
 149. See, e.g., Qi Hongli, Guojia Jingji Anquan yu Chanye Zhengce Lifa: Jiaru 
WTO gei Zhongguo Chanye Dailai de Chongji yu Riben Jingyan de Qishi [The National 
Economic Safety and Industrial Legislation: Challenges after China’s Accession to the 
WTO, with Special Reference to Japanese Experience], 19 YUNNAN FIN. & ECON. U. J.
ECON. & MGMT., CHINA 123 (2003); see also Meng Yanbei, Chanye Zhengce yu 
Fanlongduanfa de Chongtu yu Xietiao [The Conflict and the Coordination between the 
Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law and the State’s Industrial Policy], 2 SOC. SCI. R., CHINA 78 
(2005); see also Liu Guiqing, FANLONGDUANFA ZHONG DE CHANYE ZHENGCE YU 
JINGZHENG ZHENGCE [THE RELATION BETWEEN COMPETITION POLICY AND INDUSTRIAL 
POLICY IN ANTITRUST LAW] 2 (2010). 
 150. Yong Huang & Shan Jiang, Thirty Years of PRC Anti-Monopoly Law under 
“State-Market” Yardstick: From Retrospective and Prospective Viewpoints, in THE
DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION LAW: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 177 (Roger Zäch et al. eds., 
2010).
 151. Xiaoye Wang, Highlights of China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law, 75 ANTITRUST
L.J. 133, 142 (2008) (maintaining that allocative efficiency and productive efficiency are 
two elements of economic efficiency in the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law).
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the impact of economic development one way or another.152 Therefore, in 
China, a brief review of the history of the Anti-Monopoly Law’s 
development shows that it is synchronous with the gradual acceptance of 
the market mechanism by the State. Two years after the “Reform and 
Opening Up” Policy (1978), the State Council released the first 
competition policy (“the Interim Provisions on Carrying Out and 
Protecting Socialist Competition”) in 1980.153 From then on, market 
mechanisms have started to be gradually introduced to China. Since the 
end of the 1980s and the start of the 1990s, in order to keep pace with 
Chinese “deepening reform,”154 the State has progressively 
acknowledged that market mechanisms, especially competitive 
mechanisms, should play an active role in the State’s industrial and 
economic development.155 In 1993, the Law of China against Unfair 
Competition 1993 and ‘the Provisions on the Prohibition of the 
Restriction on Competition by Public Utility Enterprises’ (1993),156
which focused on fair competition and specific administrative rights in 
the market, came into effect. Afterwards, the development of competition 
law and policy finally ushered in the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law in 
2007. 
 152. CHINA’S DEEP REFORM: DOMESTIC POLITICS IN TRANSITION 239 (Dittmer & 
Liu eds.) (2006). 
 153. Guowuyuan Guanyu Kaizhan he Baohu Shehui Zhuyi Jingzheng de Zanxing 
Guiding [The Interim Provisions on Carrying Out and Protecting Socialist Competition] 
(promulgated by St. Council, Oct. 17, 1980, expired Oct. 6, 2001), 
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/shuju/1980/gwyb198016.pdf.  
 154. Deng Xiaoping, We Should Maintain Moderately Rapid Growth of 
Production, in SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING VOL. III: 1982–1992 (1994) 
(maintaining that “China is deepening its reform, trying to create more favourable 
conditions for future development”). 
 155. Li Peng, 1992 Zhengfu Gongzuo Baogao [1992 Government Work Report], 
HISTORY OF CHINA (Mar. 20, 1992), http://www.hprc.org.cn/wxzl/wxysl/lczf/dishiyijie_4/ 
200908/t20090818_27702.html. 
 156. The SAIC launched The Provisions on the Prohibition of the Restriction on 
Competition by Public Utility Enterprises (1993) to prohibit Chinese public enterprises 
(e.g. enterprises providing postal services, telecommunication services, transportation 
services, water supply, electricity supply, etc.) from abusing their market power to 
interrupt competition and reduce consumer welfare. Guanyu Jinzhi Gongyong Qiye 
Xianzhi Jingzheng Xingwei de Ruogan Guiding [The Provisions on the Prohibition of the 
Restriction on Competition by Public Utility Enterprises] (1993) (promulgated by the 
SAIC, Dec. 24, 1993, effective Dec. 24, 1993), 
http://gkml.saic.gov.cn/auto3743/auto3746/200807/ t20080729_112475.htm. 
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In the progression and development of the Chinese economy, State 
intervention has been widely used. Nowadays, in the context of State 
intervention, both the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 and the State’s 
industrial policy are most useful and common tools for maintaining 
competition in the market. The most important distinction between them 
is that the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 is the core rule,157 while the 
State’s industrial policies are regional or temporary policies for specific 
purposes.
As the most basic rule for encouraging and protecting fair competition 
in the market, the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 not only needs to 
use market mechanisms, especially competition mechanisms to ensure 
the vitality of the market, but also has to prevent the disadvantages of 
market competition.158 Because competition within the market among 
competitors is an individual behavior, nearly every competitor is 
concerned with its unique “self-interest,”159 and proposes to maximize it 
without limitations.160 Hence, without necessary restrictions, some 
market competitors probably gain strength at the expense of others. Even 
so, it is generally assumed that in the market, “[t]he promotion and 
protection of competition is a rule of thumb for maximizing welfare.”161
Accordingly, as the source of the market vitality, market mechanisms 
also should be the trump card for the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007.
Due to the advantages and disadvantages of market mechanisms, the 
Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 adopts the fair use of it, which seems 
 157. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 66, at Foreword. 
 158. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
Competition Policy and Efficiency Claims in Horizontal Agreements) OCDE/GD(96)65 
(1996) (pointing out that “[t]here is general consensus that the basic objective of 
competition policy is to protect and preserve competition as the most appropriate means 
of ensuring the efficient allocation of resources – and thus efficient market outcomes – in 
free market economies”). 
 159. Adam Smith presumed that “self-interest” drove individual competitors to 
persuade customers on grounds of quality and value to make a particular purchase. ADAM
SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
 160. Sonya Margaret Willimsky, The Concept of Competition, 18 EUR.
COMPETITION L. REV. 54, 54 (1997) (maintaining that “[c]ompetition is the principal 
regulator of commercial forces . . . individual competitors’ motivating force derives from 
the pursuit of self-interest”).  
 161. Timo Välila, No Policy is an Island – On the Interaction Between Industrial 
and Other Policies, in AN INDUSTRIAL POLICY FOR EUROPE?: FROM CONCEPTS TO ACTION
8, 19 (Armin Riess ed., 2006). 
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to be the most important, popular and common alternative method of 
enhancing economic efficiency and avoiding market failure. 
2. State-Oriented Industrial Policy in China 
By contrast, as regards the lifeline of the national economy and 
national security, market mechanisms may not be sufficient to improve 
the global competitiveness of Chinese enterprises over a limited period 
of time. Instead, large-scale merger and reorganization seems to be a 
rapid and effective method for SOEs in several traditional State-owned 
industries (such as the steel industry, the petroleum industry, and so 
on).162 Hence, for the growth of the Chinese economy, the State-oriented 
industrial policy cannot be discarded. However, based on the State’s 
industrial policy, the development approach adds too many of the State’s 
desires to control the growth approach of SOEs and privately owned 
SMEs. In other words, in the area of Chinese industrial policy, efficient 
allocation of resources, and avoiding the prospect of market failure, can 
both be achieved by the actions of the State. However, the State cannot 
always be correct in intervening in the market: smooth economic 
development requires that the State industrial policy should be limited, 
and become a much more moderate method of driving Chinese economic 
growth. Otherwise, optimizing the allocation of resources could not be 
achieved, and the market failure may turn into government failure.163
For instance, in order to transform China’s steel industry into a large-
scale industry, the State Council enacted the ‘Steel Industry 
Revitalization Plan’ in 2009, which considered that economic efficiency 
is absolutely related to the industrial scale.164 Therefore, with the 
intention of enhancing the global competitiveness of steel SOEs, “big is 
 162. CHIEN-HSUN CHEN & HUI-TZU SHIH, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN CHINA:
IMPACTS OF WTO ACCESSION 38–42 (2008). 
 163. State intervention is a commonly-used model for countries all over the world 
to avoid market failure. However, the fact is that, in the market, the shortcomings of 
governments are no less than those of markets. CHARLES WOLF, JR., MARKET OR 
GOVERNMENTS: CHOOSING BETWEEN IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 12–33 (2d ed. 1993). 
 164. See, e.g., [Steel Industry Revitalization Plan of China]; see also Guowuyuan 
Bangongting Guanyu Jingyibu Jiada Jieneng Jianpai Lidu Jiakuai Gangtie Gongye Jiegou 
Tiaozheng de Ruogan Yijian [Several Statements of the State Council on Further 
Structure Adjustment of Steel Industry] (promulgated by the St. Council, June 4, 2010, 
effective June 4, 2010), http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2010-06/17/content_1629386.htm.  
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beautiful” has become a common dogma in the steel industry. However, 
size does not equate to strength. Concerning the rational input and output 
and reasonable scale of this industry over-production of basic and similar 
steel products already exceeded demand in China (see Figure 9 below). 
After the ‘Steel Industry Revitalization Plan’ (2009) was adopted, the 
tendency toward an excess of production over consumption appeared in 
the area of high-end steel products.165 As a result, the government-
oriented plan went against the aims of achieving an efficient allocation of 
resources and avoiding market failure, and engendered a worse situation 
of surplus production in the steel industry. 
Figure 9: Chinese Crude Steel Statistics in Million Tonnes 2006–
2011166 
However, this is not the most unwelcome outcome that was brought 
about by the administrative intervention. The intervention also 
challenges the position of market mechanisms and the authority of the 
 165. Dong Wei, Li Rongrong: Guoqi Gaige Bunengzou Huitoulu [Li Rongrong: 
SOEs Reform Cannot Turn Back], CHINA YOUTH DAILY 1, 10 (2013). 
 166. See, e.g., Nat’l Dev. and Reform Comm’n, 2006 nian Shijie Cugang 
Chanliang Dadao 12 yidun [2006 World Crude Steel Production Reached 1,200 Million 
Tonnes], NDRC, CHINA (Feb. 7, 2007, 2:59 PM), 
http://www.ce.cn/cysc/main/jtfzspsy/shwll/200702/07/t20070207_10351012.shtml; see 
also World Crude Steel Output Increases by 7.5% in 2007, INT’L IRON & STEEL INST.
(IISI) (Jan. 23, 2008), http://www.worldsteel.org/media-centre/press-releases/2008/2007-
world-steel-output.html (figured devised by author). 
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Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007. The “Steel Industry Revitalization 
Plan” (2009) allowed every provincial government to make its own 
merger plan for local steel enterprises.167 The only controlling procedure
to examine those plans was to submit them to the relevant State agency 
before putting it into practice. However, because the relevant State 
agency simply needs to know what the plan is, rather than examine 
whether it is in conformity with the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007,
this controlling procedure has no practical significance. To make matters 
even worse, there is no independent anti-monopoly enforcement agency 
in China that is dedicated to enforcing the Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 (see 
Figure 10 below) toward those administrative merger plans. Therefore, 
the voice of media criticism168 called those mergers that totally ignore the 
Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 Administrative Mergers.
Figure 10: Structure of Chinese Current Anti-Monopoly 
Enforcement Agencies at Present169 
 167. [Steel Industry Revitalization Plan of China]. 
 168. See, e.g., He, supra note 41. 
 169. See, e.g., WEN XUEGUO ET AL. EDS., FANLONGDUANFA ZHIXING ZHIDU YANJIU 
[RESEARCH ON ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM] 67 (2011) (figured devised 
by author); see also HARRIS ET AL., supra note 66, at 263. 
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Hence, apart from the same functions and a similar final objective, 
there are conflicts between the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 and the 
industrial policy, which are caused by the State’s particular stage of 
development. If the State treats the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 as 
a priority, this would be good for market mechanisms, especially the 
competitive mechanism.170 However, because of a lack of international 
competitiveness, the national economy would sooner or later be harmed. 
If the State treated the industrial policy as a priority, China’s 
international competitiveness would be assured and enhanced in the short 
term. Nevertheless, this decision would indulge the State intervention in 
the area of Chinese economic development and lead to the existing 
situation of administrative monopolies going from bad to worse.171
Thus, at present, the actual conflicts between the Chinese Anti-
Monopoly Law 2007 and the State’s industrial policy generate the 
following two questions: (1) What is the most suitable mix of conditions 
needed to treat the conflicts between them and to make them work 
together harmoniously? (2) What is the most suitable mix of conditions 
needed to create effective cooperation between the imperfect market and 
the imperfect government in the process of Chinese economic 
development? The “public interest,” the reconciliation between the 
State’s interest, the interests of enterprises and consumer welfare, might 
be the ultimate standard for the solution of these two questions. 
 170. Angela Huyue Zhang, Bureaucratic Politics and China’s Anti-Monopoly 
Law, 47 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 671, 697 (2014). 
 171. Concerning steel merger plans in Hebei province, although the previous plans 
(from 2005 to 2013) concluded that some privately owned steel SMEs disappeared 
illegally and merged steel enterprises operated independently, the Hebei provincial 
government could not allow the administrative merger to fail. Instead, the publication 
Hebei Structural Adjustment Program on the Steel Industry came into force in 2014 to 
further reduce the number of local privately owned steel enterprises. See, e.g., Gao 
Pengfei, Hebeisheng Gangtie Qiye Lianhe Chongzu Moshi Fenxi [Analysis on the 
Restructuring Mode of Steel Enterprises in Hebei Province], 10 CHINA STEEL 14, 17 
(2011); see also Yuan Zhiguang, Hebei Gangtie Chanye Jiegou Tiaozheng Zaichu 
Zuhequan [Further Restructuring in the Hebei Steel Industry], XINHUA, CHINA (Dec. 6, 
2014, 4:00 PM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqcj/xfly/2014-12-
06/content_12849807.html. 
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B. The “Public Interest” in China: Exclusion or Compromise 
Article 1 of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 insists that 
safeguarding the “public interest” is one of the major objectives of this 
law.172 Some scholars maintain that the State’s industrial policy has a 
similar final objective: the “public interest.”173 However, there is no 
consensus on the meaning of “public interest” in China.174 Whether the 
“public interest” should be excluded by other elements, such as 
consumer welfare and the State’s interest, remains a problem.175
Specifically, there is a common voice that, in the Chinese Anti-Monopoly 
Law 2007, the “public interest” is equivalent to consumer welfare.176 On 
the other hand, the State’s industrial policy always treats the State’s 
interest as a matter of priority and insists it could represent the majority 
of the “public interest” in the market.177
 172. [The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China]. 
 173. See, e.g., Qi, supra note 149, at 123; see also Wang Xiaoye, Fanlongduanfa
Zhongde Shehui Gonggong Liyi [The Public Interests in the Chinese Anti-Monopoly 
Law], CHINESE ACAD. OF SOC. SCI. REV. (2008), available at
http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49150/49153/7377262.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2015); 
see also Stiglitz, supra note 146, at 12.  
 174. Jiang Wuzhen, Fanlongduanfa Zhong de Gonggong Liyi Jiqi Shixian [The
Public Interest in Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law and its Implementation], 4 PEKING U. L.J. 
551, 553 (2010). 
 175. Xiaoye Wang, Challenges in Enforcing Chinese Antimonopoly Law, CHINESE
ACAD. SOC. SCI. (Feb. 16, 2015), http://www.iolaw.org.cn/showarticle.asp?id=2242. 
 176. Interview with famous Chinese scholar on Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law (the 
scholar did not allow the researcher to use the interviewee’s name in any written work 
arising from the study, but did consent to being interviewed), in China (2012); see also 
Interview with a leading academic expert the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law (the scholar 
did not agree the researcher to use the interviewee’s name in any written work arising 
from the study, but did consent to being interviewed), in China (2012) (the expert pointed 
out that the “public interest” is not the only goal in the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 
2007. It is vital to emphasize the importance of “consumers welfare”); see also Wuzhen, 
supra note 174, at 557 (pointing out that because “consumer welfare” concerns all 
consumers involved in different anti-monopoly cases, comprehension of this term varies 
from case to case. That is why “consumer welfare” could be used to explain the “public 
interest” in the [Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007]). 
 177. See, e.g., Zhang Shouwen, Lun Jingjifa de Xiandaixing [Study on the 
Modernity of Economic Law], in JINGJIFA LUNWEN XUANCUI [SELECTED PAPERS ON 
ECONOMIC LAW] (2004); see also Qi, supra note 149, at 123; see also Xiao Shunbin, 
Woguo Xueshujie Guanyu Gonggong Liyi de Zhuyao Guandian ji Pingjia [On the Main 
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Competition between consumer welfare and the State’s interest leads 
to a weird situation in China whereby “public interest,” which loses its 
function of keeping a balance on interests in the market, is not the same 
one in different areas. The difference between “consumer welfare,” “the 
State’s interest,” and “the public interest,” is a very necessary one. In 
fact, the “public interest,” which is wider than mere consumer welfare or 
the State’s interest, can be used to provide consumers with better-quality 
goods and services, and place enterprises in a better position to compete 
both in the nation and worldwide. Where there is competition between 
consumer welfare and national interest, which relates to the development 
of SOEs and non-SOEs, the State should adopt a neutral position.178
1. Consumer Welfare or the “Public Interest” – A 
Perspective of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 
A significant point in competition law is that “antitrust policy cannot 
be made rational until we are able to give a firm answer to one question: 
what is the point of the law – what are its goals?”179 This statement also 
holds true when one is examining the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007.
Whilst consumer welfare and the “public interest” both play important 
roles in the objectives of this Law, a question still arises: what is the 
genuine relationship between them?180 To this day, whether consumer 
welfare could be considered as the “public interest” in the Anti-Monopoly 
Law 2007 is still a conundrum. 
On the one hand, hitherto, many global mainstream competition laws 
have been more inclined to protect consumer welfare as a matter of top 
priority.181 It has been fashionable to use consumer welfare to explain the 
Points of Public Interest in Chinese Academic Circles], 6 J. YUNNAN UNIVERSITY (LAW
EDITION), CHINA 30 (2009). 
 178. See generally MARK FURSE, ANTITRUST LAW IN CHINA, KOREA AND VIETNAM 
69 (2009).
 179. ROBERT H. BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 50 
(1978).
 180. SONJA E. KESKE, GROUP LITIGATION IN EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW: A LAW 
AND ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 9-13 (2010) (pointing out that whether consumer welfare 
could be considered as the “public interest” or not also provoked debate in EU 
competition law). 
181. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, A FRAMEWORK FOR THE DESIGN AND 
IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 9 (1998) (maintaining that 
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“public interest” in many countries.182 On the other hand, there exists a 
paradox183 – competition law aims to maximize “the overall wealth of 
“competition law and policy should assign the greatest importance to fostering economic 
efficiency and consumer welfare”); see also Eleanor M. Fox, Rapporteur of Session Two,
in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 1997: OBJECTIVES OF COMPETITION POLICY 157
(Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Laraine L. Laudati eds., 1998); see also Canada Competition 
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34, § 1.1. 
The purpose of this Act is to maintain and encourage competition 
in Canada in order to promote the efficiency and adaptability of 
the Canadian economy, in order to expand opportunities for 
Canadian participation in world markets while at the same time 
recognizing the role of foreign competition in Canada, in order to 
ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable 
opportunity to participate in the Canadian economy and in order 
to provide consumers with competitive prices and product 
choices.
See also Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade 
1947, C-54 § 1. 
Article 1 The purpose of this Act is, by prohibiting private 
monopolization, unreasonable restraint of trade and unfair trade 
practices, by preventing excessive concentration of economic 
power and by eliminating unreasonable restraint of production, 
sale, price, technology, etc., and all other unjust restriction on 
business activities through combinations, agreements, etc., to 
promote fair and free competition, to stimulate the creative 
initiative of entrepreneurs, to encourage business activities, to 
heighten the level of employment and actual national income, and 
thereby to promote the democratic and wholesome development 
of the national economy as well as to assure the interests of 
general consumers. 
 182. Wuzhen, supra note 174, at 557. 
 183. See, e.g., Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, 
Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1032 (1987) 
(pointing out that “[t]he term consumer welfare is the most abused term in modem 
antitrust analysis”); see also EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 1997: OBJECTIVES OF 
COMPETITION POLICY 13 (Claus Dieter Ehlermann & Laraine L. Laudati eds., 1998) 
(maintaining that “consumer welfare should not be the central or even exclusive goal of 
antitrust, or that antitrust should be concerned about unemployment, inflation or other 
macroeconomic issues”); see also Rex Ahdar, Consumers, Redistribution of Income and 
the Purpose of Competition Law, 7 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 341, 347–48 (2002) 
(pointing out that “[l]et us return to the Chicagoan definition of consumer welfare as total 
welfare (or allocative efficiency). This is plainly wrong . . .”); see also Barry J. Rodger, 
Competition Policy, Liberalism and Globalization: A European Perspective, 6 COLUM. J.
EUR. L. 289, 303 (2000) (pointing out that however “[i]n practice there are a number of 
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society.”184 In the case of EU Competition Law, there are two ambivalent 
statements on the ultimate objective. One statement is that competition 
law protects consumer welfare rather than the whole “public interest.”185
The other statement is the complete opposite, maintaining that its 
objective should be something much more important than consumer 
welfare.186 Consumer welfare, which is advocated by EU Competition 
Law, may not fully represent the concept of “fair” completely in the 
market and society.187 However, as a sort of complex interest, the “public 
interest” is able to balance the interests of enterprises, industries, 
employees, consumers, governments, and so on. To put it another way, 
from the perspective of competition law in some countries and regions, 
there may be a need to reduce the consumer welfare on some occasions 
in order to ensure the “public interest” at the jurisdictional stage.188
This paradox appears in the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 as 
well. Although the argument that the “public interest” is similar to 
consumer welfare is prevalent in China,189 the State’s actions taken in 
different economic, social and political objectives which may form part of any particular 
competition policy”). 
 184. See, e.g., Giorgio Monti, EC Competition Law: The Dominance of Economic 
Analysis?, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION LAW: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 6 (Roger 
Zäch et al. eds., 2010); see also HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS xiv (Paolo 
Buccirossi ed., 2008). 
 185. Philip Lowe, Preserving and Promoting Competition: A European Response,
2 COMPETITION POL’Y NEWSL. 1, 1 (2006) (pointing out that “[c]ompetition is not an end 
in itself, but an instrument designed to achieve a certain public interest objective, 
consumer welfare”). 
 186. K. J. Cseres, The Controversies of the Consumer Welfare Standard, 3 COMP.
L. REV. 121, 124, 172 (2007). (“Competition law is primarily concerned with economic 
efficiency and with the overall welfare of society, without distinguishing between 
different groups of society . . . Competition policy also has other goals than improving 
final consumers’ welfare and therefore final consumers cannot and should not become the 
sole focus of competition laws.”). 
 187. Roger Zäch & Adrian Künzler, Freedom to Compete or Consumer Welfare: 
The Goal of Competition Law According to Constitutional Law, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
COMPETITION LAW: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 61, 71 (Roger Zäch et al. eds., 2010). 
 188. TOWNLEY, supra note 77, at 90. 
 189. See, e.g., Interview, supra note 176; see also Zhan Hao, ZHONGGUO 
FANLONGDUAN MINSHI SUSONG REDIAN XIANGJIE: ‘GUANYU SHENLI YIN LONGDUAN 
XINGWEI YINFA DE MINSHI JIUFEN ANJIAN YINGYONG FALV RUOGAN WENTI DE GUIDING 
[THE HOT ISSUES OF CHINA ANTI-TRUST PRIVATE LITIGATION: THE JURIDICAL
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pursuit of consumer welfare can often conflict with and indeed negate 
the “public interest.”190 As regards the reform process of the Chinese 
telecommunications industry, the fundamental purpose is to serve 
consumers better than before. However, in reality, the State helped China 
Telecom and Unicom (two SOEs) form a duopoly model in the domestic 
telecommunications market.191 Contrary to fair competition and 
consumer welfare, the telecommunications SOEs used their dominant 
position as an excuse for market segmentation. Since consumers do not 
have adequate rights to select suitable service providers and services,192
consumer welfare in the telecommunications industry is unable to be 
guaranteed. In addition, telecommunications SOEs, which control 
China’s broadband source, can refuse transactions with other potential 
competitors.193 This not only poses a dilemma to potential private 
enterprises seeking to enter the market, but also creates negative effects 
on fair competition. Thus, with the disappearance of consumer welfare 
and fair competition, the “public interest” that attempts to balance 
INTERPRETATION ISSUED BY CHINA SUPREME COURT AND THE ANALYSIS OF ANTI-TRUST
CASES] 63 (2012). 
 190. Neil W. Averitt, Protecting Consumer Choice: Competition and Consumer 
Protection Law Together, in MORE COMMON GROUND FOR INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION 
LAW? 36, 37–39 (Josef Drexl et al. eds. 2011) (maintaining that maximizing consumer 
protection, a unilateral behavior in the market “is directed against any form or seller 
conduct”).
 191. In the second half of 1992, in order to establish China Unicom (a 
telecommunications SOE), the former Ministry of Electronics Industry, the Ministry of 
Electric Power Industry and the Ministry of Railways unveiled their joint proposal to the 
State Council. This proposal highlighted the importance of introducing competition into 
the telecommunications markets, as well as mentioning the fact that this market had 
serious contradictions: China Telecom (another telecommunications SOE) monopolized 
the market and the market supply was unable to meet the demand. Subsequently, China
Unicom was established in 1994. However, contrary to the original intentions of the 
proposal, China Telecom and Unicom created a duopoly model in the domestic 
telecommunications market. Yuan Chunhui, GUANZHI ZHILI: ZHONGGUO DIANXIN 
CHANYE GAIGE SHIZHENG YANJIU [REGULATORY GOVERNANCE: EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
CHINA’S TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY REFORM] 132–33 (2009). 
 192. Interview with a staff of China Telecommunications Corporation (China 
Telecom) (the officer did not agree the researcher to use his name in any written work 
arising from the study, but did consent to being interviewed) in China (2012). 
 193. See, e.g., id; see also Wang Xiangjun, DIANXINYE ZHENGFU JIANGUAN 
YANJIU: XINGZHENGFA SHIJIAO [GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVE] 127 (2009).
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different kinds of interests in the Chinese economic growth approach is 
unable to realize.194
Therefore, in the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007, using “consumer 
welfare” to replace the “public interest” is not a wise choice,195 because 
the State may take on increasing responsibilities and intervene in the 
market in the name of consumer welfare. Accordingly, in this process, 
aside from the State’s short-term interest, other interests in the market are 
unable to be appropriately considered. Action taken by the State, 
ostensibly in the pursuit of consumer welfare, may place the “public 
interest” in jeopardy. Alternatively, if consumer welfare is maximized, 
the interests of competitors may be reduced. These competitors, the 
fountainhead of any market’s vitality, will then lose their motivation to 
compete. Such a situation would be a disaster for the market and the 
Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007. Hence, in line with the EU approach, 
choosing the “public interest” as the final aim of the Chinese Anti-
Monopoly Law 2007 is undoubtedly the most sensible way.196
Simultaneously, treating consumer welfare as an important aspect of 
realizing the “public interest” may be a better choice for China. Other 
kinds of interests, such as the State’s interest, the interests of 
competitors, consumer welfare, and so on, could thereby be protected in 
the same fashion. 
2. The State Interest or “Public Interest” – A Perspective of 
the Chinese Industrial Policy 
According to a European source, although there is a consensus that 
industrial policy in the market pursues the “public interest” in some way, 
as regards a definition of the “public interest,” the industrial policy 
 194. See Anti-Monopoly Probe into Telecom Giants Confirmed, CHINA DAILY
(Nov. 9, 2011, 3:28 p.m.), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2011-11/09/
content_14066568.htm.   
 195. Wang Xiaoye, Woguo Fanlongduan Lifa de Zongzhi [The Purpose of 
Antitrust Legislation in China], 2 J. EAST CHINA U. OF POL. SCI. & L. 98 (2008). 
 196. See, e.g., Pieter Kalbfleisch, Aiming for Alliance: Competition Law and 
Consumer Welfare, 2 J. EUR. COMP. L. & PRAC. 108, 113 (2011); see also Peter A.G. van 
Bergeijk & Erik Kloosterhuis, How to Merge with Law and Economics?, in MODELLING 
EUROPEAN MERGERS: THEORY, COMPETITION POLICY AND CASE STUDIES 1 (Peter A.G. 
van Bergeijk & Erik Kloosterhuis eds., 2005). 
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proposes that it could correspond to the State’s interest.197 However, 
similar to the role of consumer welfare in the field of the Chinese Anti-
Monopoly Law 2007, the State’s interest, which is only one element in 
the wider goal of realizing the “public interest,” cannot achieve the 
“public interest”198 if it is pursued to the exclusion of consumer welfare 
and fair competition between market participants.199 On some occasions, 
for the sake of ensuring the State’s economic security and global 
competitiveness, the State’s interest may refuse to measure allocative 
efficiency and consumer welfare for a while.200 Also, because 
redistribution of wealth might be a political issue, from the perspective of 
the State’s industrial policy,201 the State may be primarily concerned to 
pursue national/international strategic economic development objectives, 
fully consistent with the State’s demands of national development, rather 
than fair competition for individual participants.202 Nonetheless, as 
 197. Johan den Hertog, Economic Theories of Regulation, in REGULATIONS AND 
ECONOMICS 25 (Roger J. Van den Bergh & Alessio M. Pacces eds., 2nd ed. 2012). 
 198. See, e.g., Ekaterina Rousseva, RETHINKING EXCLUSIONARY ABUSES IN EU
COMPETITION LAW 12 (2010). See also David J. Gerber, LAW AND COMPETITION IN 
TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE: PROTECTING PROMETHEUS 127 (2001) (pointing out that 
exclusionary abuses, granted by regulations, can harm the “public interest”). 
 199. Harry M. Trebing, Government Regulation and Modern Capitalism, 3 J.
ECON. ISSUES 87, 92 (1969) (“Administrative agencies are ad hoc responses to specific 
economic problems and political pressures, seldom capable of policy formulation for 
adequate delineation of public interest objectives.”). 
 200. See Philip Lowe, The Design of Competition Policy Institutions for the 21st 
Century – The Experience of the European Commission and DG Competition, 3 
COMPETITION POL’Y NEWSL. 1, 6 (2008). 
 201. See, e.g., Kalbfleisch, supra note 196; See also Pieter Kalbfleisch, The
Assessment of Interests in Competition Law: A Balancing Act, in ECONOMIC LAW AND 
JUSTICE IN TIMES OF GLOBALISATION: FESTSCHRIFT FOR CARL BAUDENBACHER 455, 473 
(Mario Monti ed., 2007). 
 202. In 2013, a typically positive change was launched in the Chinese fixed-
broadband sector: China decided to open up the fixed-broadband market for private 
funds. This move could improve the usage of fixed broadband, as well as boosting market 
competition throughout the country. However, without “network interoperability” in the 
fixed-broadband sector, private operators are unable to enter the market as easily as they 
expected. Thus, the poor situation of consumers in the fixed-broadband market remains. 
See, e.g., Kuandai Zhongguo Zhanlv ji Shishi Fangan [“Broadband China” Strategy and 
Implementation Plan] (promulgated by the St. Council, Aug. 1, 2013, effective Aug. 1, 
2013), http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-08/17/content_2468348.htm; see also Zhonggong 
Zhongyang Guanyu Quanmian Shenhua Gaige Huogan Zhongda Wenti de Jueding [The 
Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms] 
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regards the “public interest,” this is unacceptable: the narrow definition 
may impede the effectiveness of the legislator regarding the 
representation of protecting fair competition in the market.203
Consequently, if restriction can be imposed on State intervention, it 
may leave the State’s interest within a reasonable range from the 
perspective of the “public interest”: the State will not do whatever it 
wants in the market to obtain the maximum pursuit of its own narrow 
interest. However, in practice, limitations on the State’s interest in the 
Chinese market are often inadequate. In order to develop certain 
industries, especially those which are concerned with the lifeline of the 
national economy and economic security, the State’s industrial policy 
favors paying much more attention to some industries,204 while, at the 
same time, the “public interest” has to unwillingly give way to the 
State’s interest.205 For example, in China, the “prosperity” of SOEs, 
which represent an important part of the State’s interest at present, 
represents some sort of unscientific growth. With the purpose of ensuring 
the State’s short-term economic interest, the Central Government of 
China chooses to develop SOEs as a matter of priority. However, such a 
trend seizes the most important aspect of the “public interest,” namely 
promotion of fair competition, without considering its functions of 
balancing different kinds of interests and contributing to long-term 
economic development. Therefore, the State’s industrial policy is unable 
to treat the State’s economic interest and other interests, such as 
consumer welfare and the interests of other competitors, equally in the 
(promulgated by the St. Council, Nov. 12, 2013, effective Nov. 12, 2013), 
http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2013-11/15/content_2528179.htm; Xiaohui Yu, Introduction to 
“Broadband China” Strategy, CHINA ACAD. OF TELECOMM. RES. MIIT (Sept. 5, 2013),
http://file.eu-
chinapdsf.org/Internet/PUB/Activity4/Results%203/Broadband%20China%20introductio
n_Yu%20Xiaohui.pdf.
 203. See MIKE FEINTUCK, “THE PUBLIC INTEREST” IN REGULATION 225 (2004). 
 204. In the 1990s, such a situation also existed in the European Union. See, e.g.,
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, State Aid Control in the European Union: Success or Failure?,
18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1212, 1213 (1994); see also Hans-Jorg Niemeyer, State Aids and 
European Community Law, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 189, 190 (1993); see also COMPETITION 
LAWS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES 109 (H. Stephen Harris et al. eds., 2001).  
 205. Välila, supra note 161, at 21 (“[T]he conflict is always present in strategic 
merger support in the absence of scale economies and in any industrial policy support 
that targets specific firms in a potentially competitive sector.”). 
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market. In the Chinese gas station sector, State intervention has helped 
oil SOEs to occupy a dominant position in the domestic refined oil retail 
market in the name of consumer welfare. However, after suffering 
through the oil shortage,206 besides the interests of SOEs (that almost 
equates to the State’s economic interest in the gas station sector), 
privately owned gas stations and consumers have been losing their 
interests and welfare.207 In the long run, the “public interest” in having a 
strong competitive gas station sector has been violated by the State’s 
short-term economic interest. 
In sum, China’s economic development relies on both the Chinese 
Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 and the industrial policy. However, in their 
cooperative relationship, both the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 and 
the industrial policy meet difficulties when trying to achieve the “public 
interest.” Without a uniform definition of “public interest” in the Chinese 
market, the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 and the industrial policies 
separately propose to use consumer welfare or the State’s interest to 
replace it. This is unacceptable. For one thing, “[c]ompetition law cannot 
. . . be rationally implemented until it has been decided whether public 
policy objectives should be considered there . . . .”208 For another, 
promoting the growth and competitiveness of specific industries could 
lead to a distortion of competition in the market.209
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
An examination of the legal framework for privately owned SMEs in 
China reveals that flaws in the Chinese Law on Promotion of SMEs 2002
and the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007, as well as conflicts between 
the State’s industrial policy and the Anti-Monopoly Law 2007, are both 
 206. See, e.g., Lin Boqiang, Zhongguo Nengyuan Zhengce Sikao [An Inside Look 
at Chinese Energy Policy] 137, 180 (2009); see also Wang Ying & Zhou Yan, Private 
Fuel Stations Scramble as Diesel Supplies Tank, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 21, 2011), 
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2011-10/21/content_13946354.htm. 
 207. Interview with staff member of China Sinopec (the staff did not agree the 
researcher to use his name in any written work arising from the study, but did consent to 
being interviewed), in China (2012). 
 208. TOWNLEY, supra note 77, at 13. 
 209. See TFEU, supra note 93. 
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reasons to engender its failure. Therefore, finding a breakthrough and 
offering solutions would be valuable outcomes of this article. 
A. The Biggest Obstacle to Chinese Privately Owned SMEs – 
Administrative Powers 
Due to the economic situation, the Central Government of China has 
granted supreme power to the State’s industrial policy to promote SOEs 
on behalf of the State’s interest. Although in principle the State should 
maintain social justice in the intervention process,210 the State cannot 
avoid pursuing its own desires and interests for self-improvement.211
Accordingly, privately owned SMEs cannot obtain adequate 
opportunities to develop, and it is difficult to make their comparative 
advantages shine. However, the Chinese Law on Promotion of SMEs 
2002 and the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 have no real functions in 
overcoming the State’s industrial policies that grant exclusive rights to 
administrative agencies and SOEs,212 and thereby preventing such a trend 
and promoting privately owned SMEs. 
B. The Core Task of the Chinese SME Legal Framework – 
Preventing the Abuse of Administrative Powers 
Under the semi-government-oriented economic growth model, 
limiting the abuse of administrative powers should be accepted as the top 
priority for the legal framework for Chinese privately owned SMEs. As 
regards the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007, first of all, because there 
is a lack of sanctions against inappropriate interventions,213 the Anti-
 210. VITO TANZI, GOVERNMENT VERSUS MARKETS: THE CHANGING ECONOMIC
ROLE OF THE STATE 52 (2011). 
 211. John Hart Ely, Choice of Law and the State’s Interest in Protecting Its Own,
23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173, 179, 196 (1981). 
 212. Xiaoye Wang & Adrian Emch, Five Years of Implementation of China’s Anti-
Monopoly Law– Achievements and Challenges, 1 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 247, 264,
271 (2013). 
 213. Zhengxin Huo, A Tiger Without Teeth: The Antitrust Law of the People’s 
Republic of China, 10 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 32, 52 (2008). See [Anti-Monopoly Law 
of the People’s Republic of China] (all articles of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007, 
which relate to the abuse of administrative power, are general principles of the 
prohibition without any specific sanctions). 
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Monopoly Law 2007 cannot control SOEs and administrative agencies in 
the market. To provide an escape route from such a negative situation 
and protect privately owned SMEs, self-improvement for anti-monopoly 
implementation should be encouraged, for instance enhancing private 
anti-monopoly enforcement in China. Although private anti-monopoly 
enforcement brought new hope to privately owned SMEs,214 the current 
private enforcement fails to compensate for the loss and cost of SMEs.215
Thus, if enhancement is possible, it will overcome the current dilemma 
and increase the opposition force to administrative interventions from the 
public and privately owned SMEs. 
Second, nowadays, linked with Chinese administrative agencies and 
SOEs, other market participants, who undergo inappropriate 
administrative directives, find it hard to be protected by the Chinese Anti-
Monopoly Law 2007 and are committed to finding close allies in the 
State’s legal system, such as the administrative law. Because, currently, 
 214. See generally [Regulations on Several Issues Concerning the Application of 
Law in the Trial of Civil Dispute Cases Arising from Monopolistic Conduct] 
(promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Jan. 30, 2012, effective June 1, 2012), 
http://www.court.gov.cn/qwfb/sfjs/201205/t20120509_176785.htm, translated in
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=343638 (China).  
 215. The high cost but low compensation of litigation may make potential 
plaintiffs in China think twice before the initiation of private anti-monopoly litigation. 
See, e.g., Wang Congcong & Song Ya, Fanlongduanfa Shishi Wunian, Heyi Minshi 
Susong cai 200 Duoqi – Fang Guowuyuan Fanlongduan Weiyuanhui Zhuania Zixunzu 
Zhuanjia, Zhongguo Zhengfa Daxue Jiaoshou Shi Jianzhong [Why Five-Year 
Implementation of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law Only Brought a Little Over 200 Civil 
Anti-Monopoly Cases – Interviewing Professor Shi Jianzhong, a Member of the Anti-
Monopoly Committee Expert Advisory Group, working in China University of Political 
Science], CHINA YOUTH DAILY, Aug. 29, 2013, at 07; see also [Regulation on Several 
Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Dispute Cases Arising 
from Monopolistic Conducts]; see also [Regulations on Several Issues Concerning the 
Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Dispute Cases Arising from Monopolistic 
Conduct] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Jan. 30, 2012, effective June 1, 2012), 
art. 14, http://www.court.gov.cn/qwfb/sfjs/201205/t20120509_176785.htm, translated in
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=343638 (China) (“If monopolistic 
conduct of defendants causes losses for the plaintiffs, the People’s Courts may require the 
defendants to stop their infringements and to compensate for damages in accordance with 
the law, based on the claims of the plaintiffs and the facts that are ascertained. At the 
request of the plaintiffs, the People’s Courts may include the reasonable expenditures of 
plaintiffs as part of their damages, i.e. the expenditures to invest and restrict the 
monopolistic conduct.”). 
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the administrative law is a useless assistant when privately owned SMEs 
cannot be protected by the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007, the 
cooperation between administrative law and the Chinese Anti-Monopoly 
Law 2007 should be improved. The improvements should be considered 
on behalf of non-SOEs and focus on decreasing the frequency of the 
abuse of administrative powers in the market and reducing the situation 
of bureaucrats shielding one another. Privately owned SMEs will then 
obtain more opportunities for development. 
CONCLUSION
Looking back over the past few decades, a number of Chinese policies 
(see supra note 12) and laws (namely the Chinese Law on Promotion of 
SMEs 2002 and the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007) have led to the 
SMEs experiencing ebbs and flows in the development process. Threats 
often come from legal flaws in the above-mentioned Laws. When facing 
discrimination from administrative powers granted by the State’s 
industrial policy, SMEs fail to receive adequate support from these two 
Laws.
The measures ‘Several Statements of the State Council on Cultivating 
the Social Service System of SMEs’ (2000), and ‘Several Statements of 
the State Council on Encouraging and Promoting the Development of 
SMEs’ (2000), which grant extra economic power to the local 
governments (at or above the county level) to guide SMEs,216 sought to 
signal the start of a new era for SME protection in China. However, the 
Chinese Law on Promotion of SMEs 2002 inherited the government-
oriented approach that favors the urgent development of SOEs in the 
name of promoting SMEs. Thus, although Articles 6 and 7 of the 
Chinese Law on Promotion of SMEs 2002 aim to create fair competition 
circumstances for SMEs by limiting the abuse of administrative power, 
they have no practical improvement effects because “officials shield one 
another.”
Corresponding to gradual shifts prompted by Government’s desire to 
move the economy to market mechanisms, legislative work on the 
Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law started in the early 1990s,217 and finally led 
 216. Xiangfeng, supra note 29. 
 217. WANG, supra note 63, at viii, xiv–xv, 38.   
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to substantive change in 2007, when the first Chinese Anti-Monopoly 
Law 2007 was signed.218 However, although there is a view that 
“competition currently has the leading role” in China,219 actions taken by 
the State pursuit of economic growth, have often cut across the Chinese 
Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 being allowed to achieve its desired impact 
from the perspective of privately owned SMEs. 
Privately owned SMEs are impossible to ignore in the Chinese Anti-
Monopoly Law 2007 because they can achieve the ultimate objective of 
this Law, the “public interest,” by the way of reconciling competing 
interests in the market (such as consumer welfare and the interests of 
enterprises). However, because the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007
chooses the approach of punishment and correction220 to restrict 
administrative powers, the industrial policy often acts outside this Law: 
granting powers to SOEs and administrative agencies to limit and hinder 
the normal development of privately owned SMEs. Thus, privately 
owned SMEs may seek assistance from the Chinese administrative laws 
and regulations. However, to date, administrative laws and regulations 
have been an unhelpful approach because many administrative actions 
cannot be challenged by administrative lawsuits. Privately owned SMEs 
continually face discrimination without effective remedies. 
Now that the situation has been highlighted, two important reasons 
provide an explanation. The first is that there is no effective sanction 
against inappropriate administrative interventions which interfere with 
the effective implementation of the Chinese Law on Promotion of SMEs 
2002 or the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007.221 The second is that the 
Central Government of China has the right to influence legislative 
agencies in making decisions, and naturally often chooses to preserve the 
State’s interest as a matter of priority and urgency in the development 
process. However, maximizing the State’s interest cannot concurrently 
 218. Williams, supra note 66, at 108.  
 219. Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Illuminating the Story of China’s Anti-Monopoly 
Law, ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 4 (Oct. 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
publishing/antitrust_source/oct13_ohlhausen_10_29f.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 220. [Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. of the Tenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 
2008), art. 51, available at http://www.china.org.cn/government/laws/ 
2009-02/10/content_17254169.htm. 
221. Huo, supra note 213, at 52. 
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achieve other interests in the market, such as consumer welfare, the 
interests of competitors, and so on. The State’s interest is usually in 
competition with the ultimate objective of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly 
Law 2007, the”public interest.” Therefore, for the sake of ensuring the 
development of privately owned SMEs and even the State’s long-term 
prosperity, both the use of executive power and the State’s interest in the 
Chinese market should be limited. 
Accordingly, it is essential to identify the fact that administrative 
powers are the biggest obstacle to privately owned SMEs in the Chinese 
market. The Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 2007 should take them 
seriously. And administrative law and the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law 
2007 should work closely together to restrict them. In brief, the Chinese 
SME legal framework, which has been constructed over the last ten 
years, has suffered partial failure and is in urgent need of improvement. 
 
